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SUMMARY 
In this study the dynamic aspects of the indirect f i r e support bat­
t l e are discussed with respect to the a l locat ion and control of weapons 
systems. A detai led computer simulation is then developed using DYNAMO, 
a specia l purpose simulation language developed for use in dynamic model­
ing. The result ing model has some 650 equations. This simulation is 
tested for s ens i t i v i ty on three hypothetical weapons mixes, two of which 
are c lo se ly s imilar to the present mix, and one of which is varied to an 
extreme within cost and personnel constraints . 
The development of the complex model of two-sided ba t t l e consumed 
most of the author's e f f o r t and time ran out before a thorough analysis 
of the s e n s i t i v i t y and consistency of the model could be completed. A l ­
though the degree of s e n s i t i v i t y could not be established i t appears that 
the model is sens i t ive to changes in mix parameters and further analysis 




The United States Army Infantry Board, whose respons ib i l i ty i t is 
to represent infantry units in the research and development process, is 
conducting a study of infantry indirect f i r e weapons. A recent review of 
t e s t methodologies (1) reveals that careful ly control led f i e l d tes ts of 
equipment are envisioned with human and organizational variables el iminated. 
There can be l i t t l e doubt that control led test ing and evaluation of new 
(and o ld) weapons is necessary, but i t a l so appears s ign i f i cant to consider 
these weapons in the l ight of human and organizational var iab les . The ef­
fect iveness of these weapons depends not only on physical properties but 
a lso depends on how and by whom the weapon is to be used. For example, a 
f i r e support weapon which f i res a 40 mil l imeter round only 400 meters might 
be eliminated out of hand in competition with other f i r e support weapons. 
But this weapon, the M79 Grenade Launcher is used at squad l e v e l , very 
c lose to the enemy where i t s small s i z e and l ight weight provide high ex­
plos ive f i r e which is great ly appreciated by front l ine infantrymen. 
Clearly the leve l in the Army organization a t which this weapon is con­
t r o l l e d is a key factor in i t s e f fec t iveness , regardless of how e f f e c t i v e ­
ness is defined. 
Analysis which includes organizational variables is d i f f i c u l t in 
the f i e l d . Testing of weapons mixes within a brigade for example would 
require many repet i t ions of each proposed configuration and involve, at a 
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minimum, a l l of the indirect f i r e control elements of the brigade. Under 
the current organization this would be nearly 400 men. Even this e f f o r t 
would produce only questionable resul ts because of the d i f f i c u l t y in ac­
counting for learning rates of crews as new configurations and weapons are 
introduced. Most importantly, however, combat conditions can only be ap­
proximated for the obvious safety reasons. 
This kind of evaluation question is best approached through model­
ing techniques of operations research, but because of the complexity of 
organizational problems, we can expect only to a s s i s t subject ive decis ion 
makers in comparing a l t erna t ive s . 
H i s t o r i c a l l y , organization and operating doctrine have been the 
framework for providing new answers to weapons mix quest ions. The m i l i ­
tary concept with which we are dealing here is that certain men and equip­
ment belong to a certain unit , such as a company and the unit commander is 
free to use these men and equipment as he thinks best to accomplish his 
assigned miss ions. These men and their equipment are termed organic to 
the unite While the unit is r e l a t i v e l y independent in i t s conceptual use 
of organic a s s e t s , units do not in fact often operate independently ( e . g . , 
companies are nearly always organic to battal ions jus t as platoons are or ­
ganic to companies). The formal statement of one uni t ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s 
to another is ca l led operating doctr ine . Some r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s are quite 
obvious and need l i t t l e explanation ( e . g . , bat ta l ions are responsible to 
supply food and ammunition to assigned and attached companies). But other 
operating doctrines are not obvious, indeed they may be purely arb i trary . 
This is because the purpose of doctrine is not necessari ly to accomplish 
a task e f f i c i e n t l y . I t is rather to insure that a l l actions and respon-
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s i b i l i t i e s are understood by a l l par t i e s , and unnecessary confusion is 
avo ided. 
Because of these d i f f i c u l t i e s we must ta lk of the a l loca t ion of 
control of weapons systems rather than simply the a l locat ion of weapons 
themselves. The a l loca t ion of the weapons themselves may or may not be 
relevant since operating doctrine can and does define s p e c i f i c a l l y what 
f i r e support one unit commander must give and another may expect. The a l ­
location of control of weapons systems therefore may be through organiza­
t ion or through doctrine. With this brief background l e t us now look at 
how the control of weapons systems is currently a l l oca ted . Since the U .S . 
Army has many types of missions with many organizations we can only con­
s ider a representative s l i c e . The infantry batta l ion is composed of three 
r i f l e companies and a headquarters company in which the bat ta l ion organic 
f i r e support weapons are located. Now, when a bat ta l ion is assigned to 
a brigade, control of the f i r e of a l l weapons organic to the bat ta l ion is 
a l located by the d iv i s ion commander to the brigade commander, but the b r i ­
gade commander is expected to leave the weapons organic to the bat ta l ion 
under the control of the bat ta l ion commander. The brigade commander may, 
in addit ion, receive the assigned support of an a r t i l l e r y bat ta l ion which 
means that a r t i l l e r y bat ta l ion w i i l f i r e missions from the brigade com­
mander with highest p r i o r i t y . The brigade commander may (and by our a s ­
sumption does) a l l oca te f i re s to the ba t ta l ion . Note that the a r t i l l e r y 
pieces do not belong to the brigade commander, but some or a l l of their 
f i re s do belong to him. The d iv i s ion commander w i l l normally have r e ­
tained control of some f i r e support so he can influence act ion , i f neces­
sary, and down thru the chain of command each commander has a wel l defined 
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"parce l" o f con t ro l over weapons. At company l e v e l , for instance, we must 
consider the fol lowing po ten t i a l ly ava i lab le types of ind i rec t high exp lo ­
it 
s ive f i r e support as these weapons systems are current ly a l l o c a t e d : 
Three organic p la toons , each o f which has s i x 40 mm grenade 
launchers. 
An organic 81 mm mortar sec t ion with three mortars, forward o b ­
server at each pla toon. 
The ba t ta l ion to which our company is assigned has a 4 .2 inch mortar 
sec t ion with four mortars which supports our company and two others on ly , 
forward observers at company headquarters. 
The brigade has one ba t ta l ion o f eighteen 105 mm howitzers in d i ­
r ec t support . This ba t ta l ion supports nine companies including ours , f o r ­
ward observers are at company headquarters. 
The d i v i s i o n has one ba t ta l ion o f 155 mm and 8 inch howitzers with 
twelve guns in general support. This ba t ta l ion gives i t s p r i o r i t y o f 
f i r e s to the d i v i s i o n commander but can r e i n f o r c e . Fire divided among 27 
companies, forward observer at company headquarters. 
Corps has one armed he l i cop t e r company with f i f t een a i r c r a f t , up 
to 150 so r t i e s per day. Sor t ies are a l loca ted to d i v i s i o n s , sub a l loca ted 
to br igades , bat ta l ions and companies. Forward con t ro l on company radios 
is p o s s i b l e . 
Corps has 90 so r t i e s o f f igh te r a i r c r a f t a l loca ted d a i l y . Sor t ies 
Since actual number o f ba t ta l ions per d i v i s i o n , actual number o f 
h e l i c o p t e r s , and actual number o f f ighter so r t i e s are var iable this l i s t 
i s not actual but only t y p i c a l . 
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are sub a l loca ted as are armed he l i cop t e r so r t i e s„ Forward a i r c o n t r o l l e r 
at ba t ta l ion l eve l on ly . 
Only 81 mm, 4 .2 inch mortar and .85 mm howitzer , plus the 60 mm 
mortar system w i l l be considered in this study because these are the weap­
ons of in teres t to the Infantry Board, 
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CHAPTER I I 
LITERATURE SEARCH 
The e a r l i e s t attempt to apply the techniques o f quanti ta t ive 
analysis to armed c o n f l i c t was made by F. W. Lanchester ( 2 ) . He theorized 
sets o f simultaneous d i f f e r e n t i a l equations to descr ibe the loss rates of 
opposing f o r c e s . Bonder (3) provides a thorough discussion o f the impl i ­
ca t ions o f Lanchester 1 s Equations of Warfare, as they are c a l l e d . Most, 
i f not a l l , mathematical models and simulations o f combat derive from the 
work of Lanchester. 
The f i r s t t a c t i c a l simulation developed by the U. S. Army was Car-
monette ( 4 ) . This model was o r i g i n a l l y a platoon l eve l model and was 
la ter expanded to be capable o f handling company l eve l problems. 
Centaur (5) fol lowed Carmonette in 1962 and was capable o f handling 
brigade l eve l problems. Legion (6) was aggregated from Centaur in about 
1968 to simulate d iv i s ion l eve l problems. Legion i s , by Bonder's d e f i n i ­
t i o n , a war game since i t in te r faces human players to exogenously supply 
key d e c i s i o n s . More recent ly Individual Unit Action (IUA) (7) and DYNTACS 
(8) have been introduced. 
IUA i s a combat simulation designed to provide a basis for compar­
ing and analyzing the combat and c o s t - e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f tank, antitank, and 
assault weapons systems. This simulation i s further spec ia l i zed to the 
extent that i t portrays a ba t ta l ion task force in the o f f e n s e , defense, 
and delay, and provides an appropriate opposing f o r c e . While ind i r ec t 
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f i r e support systems are not the subjects of analysis in IUA, their ef­
fects are considered through a supporting module. Since the f i r e support 
system module is only supporting, severe s impl i f icat ions have been made, 
including l imitat ion to preplanned concentrations only, no apparent recog­
ni t ion of varying weapons system c a p a b i l i t i e s , no apparatus to r e f l e c t 
the e f fec t s of battery d is locat ions and no consideration of the counter-
battery role or a t t r i t i o n on indirect f i r e systems. 
DYNTACS is considered to be the best combat simulation in use to­
day and requires spec ia l discussion. DYNTACS is a general, high resolu­
t ion simulation designed to support analysis of the combat performance of 
a bat ta l ion sized armored unit . Of spec i f ic interest in DYNTACS is an ar ­
t i l l e r y module which provides indirect f i r e input to the general b a t t l e 
simulation and a new counterbattery module which subjects the or ig ina l ar ­
t i l l e r y module output to a t t r i t i o n and allows analysis of indirect f i r e 
support e f fec t s under a variety of tact ics and c a p a b i l i t i e s . Together, 
those two modules provide a capabi l i ty in DYNTACS to consider target of 
opportunity f i r e s , on c a l l f i r e s , scheduled f i r e s , and adjustment f i r e s in 
both the f i r e support and counterbattery f i r e s . The high leve l of reso­
lut ion of the simulation allows consideration of methods of employment of 
counterbattery f i r e , spec i f i c bat ter ies for mission assignment, assignment 
of pr ior i ty l e v e l s , scheduled counterbattery f i res and responsive counter­
battery f i r e s . 
While DYNTACS has very high resolut ion and considers indirect f i r e 
support in an act ive environment where the fr iendly output is subject to 
an enemy input there are several elements of our problem to which the 
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DYNTACS model is not addressed. We must concern ourselves with the flow 
of information, ammunition, and missions in terms of response delays in 
order to properly answer questions about levels of control and leve ls of 
operation. Without consideration of these aspects of the problem a po­
t e n t i a l l y s ign i f i cant factor is ignored. DYNTACS is capable of handling 
what are defined as "surge" s i tuat ions where high levels of a c t i v i t y over­
load the mission c a p a b i l i t i e s . I t handles this "surge" s i tuat ion through 
a pr ior i ty assignment routine s imilar to that used in actual systems. 
What are the responses to delayed mission with regard to ammunition 
resupply, enemy troop, and weapon strength? What are the responses to de­
layed ammunition resupply? Most s p e c i f i c a l l y can these delays be reduced 
by organizational changes such as l eve l of control and leve l of operation. 
An analysis of the dynamic nature of the indirect f i r e support systems may 
shed l i gh t on these quest ions. 
Another feature of DYNTACS that reduces i t s s u i t a b i l i t y is i t s a r ­
mor or ientat ion . Mortars are e s sen t ia l l y infantry and ant i - infantry weap­
ons. I t seems preferable that they be considered in an infantry b a t t l e 
environment. While this point may seem questionable to the reader un­
trained in t a c t i c s , i t should suf f i ce to point out that markedly d i f ferent 
tact ics and equipment must be used in d i f ferent p laces . Infantry is not 
highly suited to deserts and open p la ins . On the other hand Armor is not 
wel l suited to mountainous or swampy terrain . This being the case , the 
armored b a t t l e is not the infantry ba t t l e and infantry tact ics and capa­
b i l i t i e s should be viewed separately . Therefore, a simulation based on 
infantry doctrine organization and equipment w i l l be better suited to con­
s ider infantry weapons and organizations. 
9 
While the above simulations seem to r e f l e c t the mainstream of quan­
t i t a t i v e analysis of armed combat, two other approaches have been pursued. 
Seth Bonder in 1965 developed a k i l l rate probabi l i ty d i s tr ibut ion 
for weapons systems that adjust f i r e based on the resul ts of previous 
rounds, as an expansion of the Lanchester a t t r i t i o n rate equations ( 9 ) . 
By 1970, Bonder and Farre l l had developed a set of ana ly t i ca l models of 
bat ta l ion task forces a c t i v i t i e s ( 1 0 ) . The value of this ana ly t i ca l ap­
proach compared to simulation i s : 
1. A savings in man hours of development time and minutes of com­
puter run time. 
2 . Reduced d i f f i c u l t y in recognizing sens i t ive independent v a r i ­
ables . 
3 . An inherent general i ty which lends i t s e l f to theoret ical ex-
tens ion. 
Because of the higher e f f i c iency of analyt ic models they are a t ­
tract ing increasing in teres t . Doubt remains, however, that complex sys ­
tems with hundreds or even thousands of variables can be adequately mod­
eled a n a l y t i c a l l y . An a l ternat ive approach to quantitat ive ana lys i s , 
which this study fo l lows , is simulation through the use of special purpose 
languages, s p e c i f i c a l l y DYNAMO. The value of specia l purpose languages 
is that they free the user from the detai led programming considerations 
necessary in FORTRAN or ALGOL programs. General Purpose Systems Simula­
t ion (GPSS) and DYNAMO are two spec ia l simulation languages. GPSS is p r i ­
marily oriented to the queuing theory approach while DYNAMO is s p e c i f i ­
c a l l y designed to f a c i l i t a t e the consideration of dynamic systems. 
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DYNAMO was developed by Fox and Pugh (11) as a program extension of the 
Industrial Dynamics theories of Forrester ( 1 2 ) . Industrial Dynamics is 
the appl icat ion of the dynamic feedback theories of e lectronics to indus­
t r i a l systems. I t should be c lear that a combat problem with i t s t a c t i c a l 
contro l , f i r e control , and target response feedback loops is part i cu lar ly 
suscept ible to dynamic ana lys i s . 
As might be suspected by the reader, one of the great problems in 
the use of simulations has been the high leve l of specia l ized knowledge 
necessary both to write and to understand computer simulations. Most m i l ­
i tary decis ion makers do not have the opportunity to learn computer pro­
gramming and, conversely, s k i l l e d computer simulation personnel seldom 
have a thorough understanding of mi l i tary t a c t i c s . The resul t has been 
a gap in understanding, exemplified by e i ther undue confidence in, or r e ­
jec t ion of, analysis by simulation, which has reduced the usefulness of 
other simulations ( 1 3 ) . Since mi l i tary decision makers require years of 
training and experience to reach an acceptable l eve l of competence i t would 
be preferable to s implify the simulation problem for use by mi l i tary of­
f i cers rather than try to lend combat experience, for instance, to re ­
searchers and computer personnel. DYNAMO accomplishes this to a consider­
able degree. Computer operating instructions are completely eliminated 
and relat ionships of the real system are represented by simple equations 
involving l i t t l e more than addit ion, subtraction, mul t ip l i ca t ion , and d i ­
v i s ion . Moreover, resu l t s are shown graphical ly . 
A l l of the mi l i tary applicat ions of DYNAMO to date have been done 
at the Georgia Ins t i tu te of Technology. Davis (14) used DYNAMO in the 
simulation of an assaul t r iver crossing problem. Faulkender (15) simulated 
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a counterinsurgency problem. Abele (16) and Krol (17) simulated a platoon 
leve l combat s i tuat ion . Abele simulated a one sided platoon defensive 
s i tuat ion and Krol extended that model to a two sided problem which in­
cluded the e f fects of indirect f i r e . Meyer (13) further expanded the same 
model to include movement on f l a t terrain and the e f fec ts of ammunition re ­
supply. He considered only small arms in his simulation and did not con­
s ider indirect f i r e support. 
This study i s , in some respects , an extension of the work of Abele , 
Krol , and Meyer in that i t is a DYNAMO simulation of combat at company 
l e v e l . In other respects , however, i t is an independent simulation in that 
i t does not consider the small arms a t t r i t i o n rates and i t generates sim­
i l a r but more special ized movement var iables . 
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CHAPTER I I I 
OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH 
Object ives 
The ob j ec t i ve s o f this study are : 
1. To bui ld a dynamic model of the present ind i rec t f i r e support 
ba t t l e system using DYNAMO and based on present organizat ions and doc t r ines . 
2 . To compare measures o f combat e f fec t iveness for the present o r ­
ganizat ion with those o f hypothet ical va r i a t ions . 
3 . To ident i fy any related internal response changes. 
Scope 
A l l equipment, doc t r i na l , and organizat ional data pertain to the 
infantry ba t ta l ion operating independently. The s e l e c t i o n o f the inde­
pendent infantry ba t ta l ion l imits the s i ze o f the study while considering 
a l l weapons systems o f in te res t to the Infantry Board and consider ing the 
company l eve l problem. Se lec t ion of an actual organizat ion and mode o f 
operat ion s i g n i f i c a n t l y reduces the number o f assumptions necessary to de­
f ine a c losed system. 
DYNAMO Modeling Procedure 
The obvious dynamic nature o f the f i r e con t ro l ba t t l e requires dy­
namic ana lys i s , and the complexity o f the problem suggests computer simu­
la t ion rather than an ana ly t ic approach. DYNAMO is a language developed 
to simulate dynamic systems, but i t i s designed to support a s p e c i f i c ap-
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proach, that of indust r ia l dynamics. While this study is not intended to 
be an indust r ia l dynamics study, the use o f DYNAMO requires acceptance of 
some of the assumptions o f indust r ia l dynamics and some understanding o f 
the concepts behind indust r ia l dynamics. Jay Forres ter , the leading ex­
ponent o f this philosophy wrote, "An information feedback system ex i s t s 
whenever the environment leads to a dec i s ion that resul ts in ac t ion which 
a f f e c t s the environment and thereby influences future d e c i s i o n s • " ( 1 8 ) 
Thus, s o c i a l , as we l l as physical systems can be modeled dynamically. In 
Industr ia l Dynamics, systems are composed of information feedback loops . 
A l l feedback loops are composed of l eve l s (or accumulat ions) , flow ra tes , 
and information,, Flow rates cause accumulations to vary with time. Levels 
provide input to the information network and information through a d e c i ­
s ion process cont ro ls the flow ra te . Thus, a rese rvo i r with an input 
va lve , an output va lve , and a f l o a t stop on the input is diagrammed as 
shown in the fo l lowing sketch. 
In the DYNAMO diagram L is the l eve l o f the r e se rvo i r , RI is the 
input ra te , and RO is the output ra te . The s o l i d arrows represent the 
flow o f water. The dotted arrows represent the flow of information, from 
L to RI through the mechanical f l oa t device and from L to RO, because 
we know from physics that flow rate out is a function o f head (or l e v e l ) „ 
The c i r c l e s with M and F represent auxi l ia ry var iables through which 
raw information is processed to be used in adjusting the r a t es . F o b ­
v ious ly is the funct ional re la t ionship between L and RO. M however is 
not a simple natural law. It is a re la t ionship b u i l t to r e f l e c t the 
b u i l d e r ' s des i res in designing the f l o a t mechanism, and i t may depend on 
(a) 
QlELfiV M Q£L.Ay f 
Figure 1. A Physical Example o f a DYNAMO Model 
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Figure 2 . DYNAMO Diagram o f Ammunition Supply System 
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information from other sources i f we desire to build i t that way. In any 
real system delays occur in the transmission of information. Flexing of 
the f l oa t rod and looseness of the hinge would cause delay in control l ing 
RI for example. Delay M and delay F provide this information in the 
DYNAMO model. 
Industrial dynamics extends this feedback concept to more complex 
systems, an example of which may be taken from the subject area of this 
study. 
Suppose ammunition is supplied to the 60 mm mortar on the basis of 
the following decision rule: 200 rounds are requested every time the on 
hand leve l f a l l s to 100 rounds and i t takes s ix hours for the requested 
ammunition. Figure 2 is a Dynamo diagram of this system. The DYNAMO equa­
tions which represent this system to a computer are: 
1L AOH.K = AOH.J + (DT)(FR.JK - RRnJK) 
where AOH.K, a l e v e l , i s the current ammunition on hand, AOH.J is the am­
munition on hand at the l a s t measurement time, DT is the time interval be­
tween measurements, FR.JK is the f ir ing rate during the time period from 
J to K and RR0JK is the resupply rate during the time period J to K. 
FR is dependent on other factors not in this system, but l e t us assume FR 
equals 10, then 
6R FR.KL = 10 
20R RR.KL = NRRnK/6 
where NRR.K is the current number of rounds requested and 6 is the delay 
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from request to receipt 
NRR.K + CLIP ( 0 , 200, AOH.K, 100) 
This equation is a specia l function in the DYNAMO language and represents 
the following decis ion: i f ammunition on hand is greater than 100 then 
number of rounds requested is 0 , but i f the ammunition on hand equals or 
i s less than 100, then 200 rounds are requested. While this discussion 
has not been exhaustive, by any means, i t was intended to show the assump­
tions of Industr ia l Dynamics and construction of DYNAMO. 
Measures of Effectiveness 
Since one of the object ives of this study is to compare measures 
of e f fect iveness among a l ternat ive organizations, any system model used 
must provide as output a meaningful measure of e f fec t iveness . In def in­
ing our measure of e f fect iveness we must be general enough to insure that 
we identi fy the same c r i t e r i a for a l l types of weapons under considera­
t ion. The following elements must be considered in order to meet Depart­
ment of the Army requirements ( 1 9 ) : 
1. Time pattern of external input including demands and po­
t e n t i a l attack on the system. 
2 . The purpose of the system w i l l be to respond to external 
input to the extent the system is capable. Measures of 
this response are measures of system ef fec t iveness . 
3 . System output w i l l be input to another system and must be 
s u f f i c i e n t l y establ ished to determine any feedback. 
4 . Response to input w i l l wear out the system and cause d i ­
minished response over time. 
5 . When the system f a i l s i t normally becomes an input to an­
other system which w i l l restore capabi l i ty . 
6. A representation of the cyc l i c nature of operation may be 
necessary i f inoperabi l i ty causes backlogs. 
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7. When the system has f a i l ed or is busy, demands which can­
not be queued may be referred to another system. 
8. Operational s t ra tegies for managing the system w i l l in­
clude a l ternat ives of design, maintenance and employment. 
These spec i f i c a t i ons are provided for Department of the Army studies to 
provide uniformity and the a b i l i t y to interconnect where p o s s i b l e . 
The fol lowing is a d iscuss ion of the above requirements: 
1. For the general weapons system we want to develop, input to the 
system is some stimulation from the target system. In tu i t i ve ly , this in­
put i s l i ke an impulse because the system responds to the input and re ­
turns to a zero output s t a te . The attack input is jus t one o f the poten­
t i a l s t imuli from the target system. 
2. The response o f the system w i l l be l imited by the fol lowing 
parameters, taken from Bonder ( 2 0 ) : 
Weapon aiming and b a l l i s t i c errors 
Target loca t ion errors 
Weapon f i r i ng ra te 
Vol ley damage-pattern radius 
Target d i s t r ibu t ion 
Target radius 
Target posture 
Probabi l i ty that the target is destroyed given i t i s covered by 
damage pattern. 
The e f f ec t s o f the environment such as weather and v i s i b i l i t y w i l l be con­
sidered within the l i s t e d parameters. For example, the e f f ec t s of wea­
ther, being unpredictable w i l l be considered in the p robab i l i t y parameter. 
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In order to determine what may be measures o f e f fec t iveness we must 
f i r s t consider missions and r o l e s . The mission of the r i f l e company is 
always to c l o s e with and destroy the enemy. The r i f l e company may perform 
this mission in several ro les ranging from exp lo i t a t ion af ter a success ­
ful attack to withdrawal af ter an unsuccessful defense. The mission and 
ro l e s may a l so be performed in a var ie ty o f environments in terms o f both 
terra in and l eve l o f in tens i ty . Now, one thing we can say without qual­
i f i c a t i o n at this point is that ind i rec t f i r e support must contr ibute to 
the accomplishment o f the r i f l e company mission in terms o f the r o l e and 
environment presently occupied by the supported company. To do otherwise 
is c l e a r l y purposeless from our point o f view. How does ind i rec t f i r e 
support contr ibute to accomplishment o f the r i f l e company's mission? The 
man who ac tua l ly puts f i r e support for the r i f l e company to work is the 
r i f l e company commander and he is taught to use ind i rec t f i r e support in 
four ways: 
a. As a portable obs tac le to deny terrain or routes to the enemy. 
b . As a shie ld to suppress enemy f i r e . 
c . To return f i r e on enemy ind i rec t f i r e weapons (counterbattery 
f i r e ) . 
d. As a source o f firepower to destroy the enemy. 
In the r i f l e company's mission we can see two d i s t i n c t elements: 
1) c l o s e with the enemy and 2) destroy him. These represent two of the 
three essent ia l s o f a l l combat organizat ions which have been emphasized 
by mi l i ta ry philosophers and t a c t i c i a n s , at leas t s ince Napoleon. The 
popular phrase is "Shoot, move, and communicate." The requirement to com­
municate is not e x p l i c i t in the company's mission statement, but is 
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impl i c i t in i t s organizat ion and we shal l have to consider i t as an im­
p l i c i t part o f our system simulation. 
The four uses o f f i r e support rather c l ea r ly f a l l into one or the 
other o f the remaining two essen t ia l c a p a b i l i t i e s . The f i r s t two uses 
contr ibute to the a b i l i t y o f the r i f l e company to move or c l o s e with the 
enemy and the las t two uses c l e a r l y contr ibute to the a b i l i t y to destroy 
the enemy. Following this analysis and Quade (21) there are two c r i t e r i a 
for the e f fec t iveness o f f i r e support weapons systems. Let us c a l l one 
o f them the target des t ruct ion c r i t e r i o n and the other the maneuver sup­
port c r i t e r i o n . 
The structure of DYNAMO leads us to what must be a good and d i r ec t 
measure o f e f fec t iveness with respect to the target des t ruct ion c r i t e r i o n , 
the enemy troop strength. Enemy troop strength is obviously a l eve l and 
must d i r e c t l y r e f l e c t the a b i l i t y o f the system to meet the des t ruct ion 
part o f the r i f l e company mission. 
When ind i rec t f i r e support weapons systems are act ing in maneuver 
support, rounds are simply f i red to impact at a s p e c i f i c l o c a t i o n , and 
the wider and more dense the obs tac le made, the be t te r . Hence, this is 
a simple r o l e to handle. Three parameters obviously apply: range, accur­
acy , and e f f e c t i v e bursting radius. I f the system cannot reach the tar­
get l oca t ion i t has no value in this r o l e , but i f range is s u f f i c i e n t then 
the value of the system is then a function of the accuracy (d ispers ion 
pa t t e rn ) , e f f e c t i v e bursting radius (width of o b s t a c l e ) , and sheath s i z e 
(length of o b s t a c l e ) . Range acts on this measure o f e f fec t iveness in a 
yes or no manner then, and width and accuracy act by mult iplying together 
s ince simultaneous densi ty and width are required. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM 
In order to meet the ob j ec t i ve s o f this study the combat s i tua t ion 
is perceived as a c losed system at ba t ta l ion l e v e l . Because the r i f l e 
company commander is at a l eve l where decis ions regarding a l l of the weap­
ons systems are made, the system w i l l be viewed from his point o f view. 
The ind i rec t f i r e support elements o f an infantry ba t ta l ion are engaged 
in combat to support the a c t i v i t i e s o f the r i f l e company commander and 
they are ava i lab le to him in the fol lowing strengths and at the fo l lowing 
l eve l s ( 2 2 ) : 60 mm mortars are not now in use in infantry ba t t a l ions . 
They were used at company l eve l before the 81 mm mortar was standardized 
as the company l eve l ind i rec t f i r e weapon. Each company has three 81 mm 
mortars under i t s own c o n t r o l . The ba t ta l ion has four 4 .2 inch mortars 
which support two companies in contact with the enemy. The ba t ta l ion is 
supported by s i x 105 mm howitzers which support two companies in con tac t . 
The enemy force is supported by a varying number o f weapons de­
pendent on the r o l e . I f the enemy force i s a t tacking, then i t is sup­
ported by eighteen l i gh t mortars at company l eve l with s i x heavy mortars 
and s ix gun-howitzers at ba t ta l ion l e v e l . I f the enemy is defending, how­
ever , then he is supported by only s ix l igh t mortars at company l eve l with 
s i x heavy mortars ( 2 3 ) . These t a c t i c a l s i tua t ions are depicted at Figure 3. 
The combat ac t ion which we w i l l model occurs as f o l l o w s . To i n i t i ­
ate ac t ion l e t us assume that the f r iendly side orders a f i r e mission on 
Figure 3 . Assumed Tact ical Situation 
(a) Friendly attack 
(b) Friendly defense or delay 
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the suspected location of the enemy force . That mission is in i t ia ted with 
a period of f i r e adjustment and when the adjustment rounds are impacting 
on the intended target location the mission is completed with one or more 
v o l l e y s . During the period of adjustment any enemy troops in the area 
take warning and cover and the enemy force begins to make a response. If 
the target location is occupied by the enemy, and i f any troops are caught 
in exposed pos i t ions , then the enemy troop strength is reduced. An appro­
priate reaction in this example would be for the enemy indirect f i r e weap­
ons to f i r e on the i n i t i a t i n g friendly indirect f i r e weapons. If this 
f i r e is e f f e c t i v e , then there w i l l be fewer fr iendly indirect f i r e weap­
ons. At this point one cycle is completed and the second cycle may be in­
i t i a t e d by the fr iendly force or action may be terminated. If action is 
continued, the target now may be the suspected troop location or i t may be 
the enemy weapon pos i t ion . The resul ts of the cycle we jus t considered 
are a deplet ion of both fr iendly and enemy ammunition on hand and, depend­
ing on whether h i t s occurred or not, a depletion of enemy troop strength 
and fr iendly weapons strength. Now, since riflemen (troops) are never 
within range of indirect f i r e weapons (or should never be as long as nor­
mal operating rules are working) a troop loss w i l l have no e f f ec t on the 
next cyc le , but the ammunition expenditure, i f not replaced, w i l l eventu­
a l l y stop action and the loss of an indirect f i r e weapon decreases the ef­
fect iveness of the f i r ing unit and hence, in future cyc les , the opposing 
troop loss rate w i l l be lower and the opposing troop strength levels w i l l 
not f a l l as much in future cyc les . 
We assumed an i n i t i a t i n g mission to s tar t our example, but the rea l 
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system s tarts on real events not assumptions. These real events are the 
resul ts of t a c t i c a l decisions such as the decision to attack, and the ac­
t ion result ing from these decisions are planned missions as opposed to 
missions against targets of opportunity. 
Let us now trace the flow of information and action careful ly 
through a l l the s ign i f i cant elements. Figure 4 shows the flow of infor­
mation in combating systems in the action described above. Let us assume 
that act ion s tarts with some act (attack, withdrawal, resupply, e t c . ) by 
the enemy troop target . This is observed by the fr iendly force ( fr iendly 
troop target ( r i f l e company)) and generates a f i r e mission. The f i r e mis­
sion is transmitted to the fr iendly f i r e control element. This may be 
nothing more than the forward observer i f the weapon system is organic to 
the company, otherwise i t may expand to a s izeable organization with de­
c i s ion makers at several leve ls of command. This f i r e mission is e i ther 
transmitted to the fr iendly f i r e support unit or assigned a pr ior i ty and 
held by the f i r e control element unt i l i t can be completed. If demand is 
high from a company with an i n i t i a l l y low pr ior i ty then the pr ior i ty may 
be sh i f ted . Once the f i r e mission is transmitted to the fr iendly f i r e 
support unit , i t is converted into rounds of ammunition and f i red . This 
process involves adjustment and, hence, the information loop is repeated 
several times in each mission. The f i r ing of ammunition generates two 
flows of information. An attack input is delivered to the enemy troop 
target and a resupply input is delivered to the fr iendly resupply element. 
The attack input to the enemy troop target stimulates the enemy troop tar ­
get to respond. This may be with e i ther counterbattery f i r e on the weapon 


































^ I N F O R M A T I O N AND AMMUNITION 
Figure 4 . Information Flow Among Fire Support Elements 
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In e i ther case the impacting fr iendly rounds stimulate an information flow 
in the enemy system ident ica l to that in the fr iendly system. This infor­
mation flow is depicted in Figure 5 in terms of l e v e l s , auxi l iary func­
tions and information flow. In this diagram troop and weapons strength 
leve ls are control led by the opposing mission e f fec t iveness . Mission ef­
fect iveness is control led by the mission l eve l , mission potent ia l , and 
target a c t i v i t y l eve l (through exposure). The mission level is control led 
by the opposing unit a c t i v i t y l eve l , but the mission potent ia l is con­
t ro l l ed by terrain and movement data, ammunition l eve l , unit a c t i v i t y , and 
weapon strength l eve l . 
A discussion of the choice of flow elements to describe the prob­
lem is in order at this point . From the point of view of dynamic theory 
we could as eas i ly build our analysis in terms of the flow of rounds of 
ammunition, pounds of explosive or missions, A mission is far from a 
standard measure since missions vary extensively in terms of time, number 
of rounds and targets , therefore i t would seem at f i r s t glance that the 
mission is not a very good unit of flow. The f i r e mission was chosen as 
the element in flow because we are inquiring into the e f f ec t s of organi­
zat ional structure on the ef fect iveness of the f i r e support system and 
the f i r e mission is an organizational weapon designed for use on an op­
posing organization. That i s , one f i r e mission can always be equated to 
one target and, equally important, to one f i r ing unit in a given time in­
terva l . Obviously the comparative cost among missions w i l l require some 
common measure, but this common measure w i l l not r e f l e c t the interact ion 
between weapon and target we seek to analyze. The concept of a f i r e 
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Figure 5 . Principal Feedback Loops in an Indirect Fire Support 
Batt le System 
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mission does include the time delay events that contribute to interact ions , 
( e . g . , adjustment delay gives warning and protect ive reaction time to the 
opponent). Hence the most appropriate flow element around upon which our 
analysis can be made is the f i r e mission. 
A highly s ign i f i cant factor in the ef fect iveness of any weapon sys ­
tem, and part icu lar ly indirect f i r e weapons systems, is the random nature 
of the f i r e control process. So many unpredictable elements such as wea­
ther, temperature, enemy a c t i v i t y , and enemy location bear on the e f f e c ­
tiveness of indirect f i r e support that randomness must be considered. 
These probab i l i s t i c elements are not ref lected in the previous diagram be­
cause they are an internal part of mission e f fec t iveness . 
Following Bonder's development of the probabi l i ty of a target h i t , 
P(K|H) and his discussion of i t s extension to area f i r e weapons, i t seems 
conceptually correct to describe the probabi l i ty of target destruction 
for the indirect f i r e support weapons as the conditional probabi l i ty of a 
target k i l l given a h i t on the target area and given that the target area 
is occupied, P(K|H,T) . The probabi l i ty of a h i t is dependent on weapon 
aiming and b a l l i s t i c errors , target area locat ion errors , and vo l l ey dam­
age pattern radius. The probabi l i ty that the target area i s occupied is 
dependent on the type of mission being f i r ed , target d i s t r ibut ion , and the 
time delay from f i r s t round impact to target h i t . This time delay in turn 
is a function of weapon f i r ing rate (including adjustment time) and the 
number of rounds f ired in adjustment. The probabi l i ty of target destruc­
tion is dependent on the f i r s t two probabi l i t i e s and on target radius and 
target posture. 
29 
Since this is true o f both f r iendly and enemy systems, and in a 
c losed system the enemy k i l l rate w i l l equal the f r iendly loss ra te , the 
r a t io o f f r iendly to enemy k i l l rates r e f l e c t s the system's a b i l i t y to 
destroy assigned targets while i t s e l f surviving. 
I f we knew, somehow, that these three p r o b a b i l i t i e s were independ­
ent o f each other , then the p robab i l i ty o f target k i l l would be eas i ly 
found as the product o f the three p r o b a b i l i t i e s . There is no good reason 
however, even to assume independence among these p r o b a b i l i t i e s in the real 
system, and the ana ly t ic so lu t ion is therefore extremely complicated as 
evidenced by Bonder's work. Fortunately, we need neither assume inde­
pendence nor ana ly t i ca l ly solve a complicated p robab i l i t y statement. The 
nature of both the DYNAMO and the real system suggest that troop strength 
l eve l s are appropriate measures o f e f fec t iveness for weapons designed to 
destroy personnel. Now, this troop strength l eve l w i l l be con t ro l l ed by 
a loss rate which, in turn, w i l l be dependent on other l eve l s and ra tes , 
such as troop exposure, enemy mission a r r iva l ra te , e t c . Thus i f the ap­
propriate p robab i l i t y statements are applied at the appropriate place 
within the system and the system is c o r r e c t l y modeled, then any dependence 
among the three p r o b a b i l i t i e s we have discussed w i l l be generated by the 
information feedback inherent in the DYNAMO model. 
If this desc r ip t ion of the problem is co r r ec t then behavior o f the 
model, as r e f l ec t ed by troop strengths should be continuously decreasing, 
but at varying ra tes . In the case o f the f r iendly attack f r iendly losses 
should be greater than enemy l o s s e s , but f r iendly strength should s t i l l 
exceed enemy strength when the enemy force is forced to withdraw. 
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When the f r iendly force is defending the same re la t ionship should occur 
between attacker and defender. The predicted behavior o f the system is 
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In this chapter the construction of the simulation model w i l l be 
discussed. Because th is system i s somewhat complex, we w i l l attempt to 
maintain c l a r i t y by discussion in sect ions . F i r s t , the general system 
w i l l be described in terms o f l e v e l s , r a t e s , and generalized auxi l iary 
functions. Following the development of an overal l outl ine of the model, 
de ta i l s w i l l be added by section and f i n a l l y a complete diagram w i l l be 
presented. In order to reduce the complexity of the discussion, the 
DYNAMO equations w i l l be appended rather than presented in th is chapter. 
Because the structure of the two sides i s nearly i d e n t i c a l , c l a r i t y can be 
further enhanced by discussing only half of the system and then discussing 
only s igni f icant differences between the two sides l a t e r . 
The General Structure 
Because we want to analyze the fr iendly force , we w i l l develop 
that hal f of the bat t l e system. This general structure i s simply half of 
Figure 5 converted to DYNAMO symbols. In Figure 7 a l l symbols have been 
designated as fr iendly or enemy. From this point on, however, we w i l l 
omit that d i s t inct ion unless i t i s e s sent ia l to c l a r i t y . As the diagram 
shows, each side i s composed of f ive subsystems: a weapons strength sub­
system, a mission flow subsystem, an a c t i v i t y subsystem, an ammunition 
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FIGURE 7. GENERAL STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL 
(FRIENDLY SIDE ONLY) 
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the dec is ion links and environment fac tors represented by the three 
a u x i l i a r i e s shown. To c l o s e the loop the ent i re enemy system except 
enemy troop strength and weapon strength i s shown as a s ingle symbol. 
To discuss the de ta i led construct ion of the model, we w i l l f i r s t 
descr ibe each subsystem and then we w i l l descr ibe auxi l ia ry dec i s ion 
making s ec t i ons . 
The Subsystems 
Mission Flow 
The general structure diagram shows mission flow in terms of one 
l e v e l and two ra tes , but: the mission flow subsystem i s more complex than 
that. Because several other subsystems are dependent on d i f f e r ing out­
puts from this subsystem, several l eve l s must be defined. The target re ­
sponds to the missions de l ive red . The ammunition subsystem also responds 
to the mission del ivered in terms of ammunition expended. The unit ac ­
t i v i t y subsystem responds to both the number o f missions in progress and 
the number o f missions waiting to be processed. Therefore, th is subsystem 
cons i s t s o f three l e v e l s , the mission backlog l eve l (FMB), the missions 
in progress l eve l (FMIP), and the missions del ivered l eve l (FMD). Con­
t r o l l i n g each l eve l i s a rate with dec is ion and delay input for each. 
The mission flow subsystem i s shown in Figure 8 . 
The mission a r r iva l rate (FMAR) i s con t ro l l ed by enemy unit ac ­
t i v i t y (EUA) and fr iendly plans (PFM). Since missions are conceptual 
rather than phys ica l , their a r r iva l i s not measurably delayed so the delay 
shown here i s DT the measurement time in t e rva l . The mission acceptance 
rate (FMACR) depends on the number o f missions in progress (FMIP), the 
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assigned p r i o r i t y l eve l s as r e f l ec t ed by the f r iendly unit a c t i v i t y l eve l 
(FUA), and the number o f missions awaiting acceptance (FMB). The d i f f e r ­
ence between the number o f missions the system can accept (FUA) and the 
number o f missions in progress (FMIP) i s compared with FMB. The mission 
acceptance rate i s the lesser o f the two. 
The mission de l ivery rate (FMDR) i s dependent on the number o f 
missions in progress (FMIP) and the mission completion time (FMCT). The 
mission completion time i s the sum o f the adjustment time (FADL) and the 
v o l l e y de l ive ry time (VDL). For s impl ic i ty i t i s assumed that each mis­
sion contains only one v o l l e y and a v o l l e y consumes the time to serve the 
weapon (TS) and the time of f l i g h t (TF) so VDL equals TS plus TF. The 
adjustment time includes TS, TF, and adjustment time (TA), and the sum of 
these i s mul t ip l ied by the number o f rounds (FN) which must be f i red to 
adjust the weapon onto the ta rge t . Because of lack o f data, i t i s as­
sumed that no more than f ive rounds w i l l be required in adjustment and 
the d i s t r ibu t ion o f FN i s assumed to be as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Assumed Dis t r ibut ion o f FN, the Number o f Rounds to Adjust 






These assumptions are based on the combat experience o f the author and 
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are bel ieved to be reasonable approximations. The DYNAMO equations for 
th i s subsystem are shown in Appendix A. 
Ammunition Flow 
The ammunition subsystem must be expanded but in a d i f ferent way 
from that of the mission subsystem. Only the ammunition on hand leve l 
provides input to another part of the system, but because there are four 
d i f ferent weapons in the system there are four di f ferent types of ammuni­
tion to consider. Hence, we must expand the ammunition flow section to 
include four ammunition subsystems. Since they are a l l structured iden­
t i c a l l y , we need not develop each separately. For c l a r i t y we w i l l develop 
only one example of the ammunition subsystem. 
The ammunition on hand leve l for each weapon type i s control led 
by an ammunition f i r ing rate (FAF) and an ammunition resupply rate (FAD). 
The expenditure i s control led by the mission completion time (FMCT) and 
the number of adjustment rounds (FN) from the mission flow subsystem and 
the number of weapons f i r ing (WSH) which w i l l be developed later in the 
mission potent ia l sect ion. Since there are four separate ammunition sub­
systems, they are ident i f i ed by number ( e . g . FAF60, FAD60, e t c . ) . Re­
supply of ammunition may fol low several inventory p o l i c i e s . For the 
model, i t i s assumed that resupply i s by request and a request i s sub­
mitted when the on hand leve l reaches a preselected l e v e l . A substantial 
delay occurs between request and del ivery due to transportation delays . 
This i s re f lec ted by the DELAY 3 symbol, a special function of DYNAMO 
which causes a third order delay based on a t o t a l delay time ( 6 , in th i s 
case) and an i n i t i a t i n g rate (FAR60) which i s the ammunition requesting 
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r a t e . The DYNAMO equations for these subsystems are shown in Appendix B. 
Figure 9 i s a diagram of the ammunition flow subsystem. 
Figure 9 . The Ammunition Flow Subsystem 
Unit Ac t iv i ty Level 
This subsystem r e f l e c t s the leve l of a c t i v i t y in terms of the 
number of indirect f i r e support units committed to support of our subject 
company. The a c t i v i t y l eve l (FUA) i s control led by an input rate (FUAI) 
and an output rate (FUAO). Because a pr ior i ty change for each weapon 
requires a decision at the leve l of control for that weapon, a delay 
occurs. The higher the echelon of contro l , the longer that delay w i l l 
be , because each next higher leve l must wait while the lower evaluates 
the information. Thus, i f a weapon i s control led at brigade l e v e l , for 
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example, the time delay from occurrence of a need for a pr ior i ty switch 
and the switch includes time for the company to evaluate the need and 
forward a request to battal ion level and time for batta l ion to do the 
same thing. Pr ior i t i e s are not automatically switched, of course, because 
the requesting unit may not need the support as much as another uni t . 
For th i s model we w i l l assume that the switch does occur in every instance. 
We can do this because we are interested in comparing ef fect iveness of 
mixes and this comparison i s v a l i d in the unit under attack, hence this 
assumption should not detract from the value of the model. 
The a c t i v i t y increase rate depends on the difference between the 
present a c t i v i t y leve l and the mission backlog, but i f the a c t i v i t y leve l 
i s already four, indicating a l l units are committed, then there i s no 
level increase allowed. The a c t i v i t y decrease rate i s simply the reverse 
of the increase rate . In either case the rate i s 1, with a delay of ap­
proximately ten minutes. Figure 10 shows the unit a c t i v i t y level sub­
system. The DYNAMO equations for this subsystem are shown in Appendix C. 
Weapons Strength Level 
Any given enemy mission w i l l be directed against one target . 
This target may be enemy troops, i t may be a place on the ground (in the 
case of denial and suppressive mi s s ions ) , or i t may be an enemy indirect 
f i re weapons s i t e . I t would be nearly impossible to simulate the real 
decision process which would se lect targets because questions of p r i o r i ­
t i e s , perceived threats , and detai led fr iendly intent ions , among others , 
would have to be answered. Such resolution i s far beyond the c a p a b i l i t i e s 
of other sections of this simulation so a drast ic approximation w i l l be 
made. F i r s t , we w i l l assume that none of our missions i s a maneuver 




support miss ion. Thus 3, every mission w i l l e i ther a f f e c t the enemy troop 
strength or enemy weapons strength. This assumption w i l l have cos t us 
no loss in information because the current f r iendly mission potent ia l 
(FMP) t e l l s us a l l we need to know to compare the maneuver support a b i l i t y 
o f var ious mixes for a given miss ion. 
An assumption which w i l l cause a lo s s o f information, however, i s 
the method o f choosing between troop and weapon ta rge ts . Rather than 
attempting any o f the complex l o g i c involved , we w i l l simply assume that 
every f i f t h mission i s a counterbattery mission. The choice o f one mis­
sion in f i ve i s purely a rb i t ra ry , since no data has been found on the 
actual frequency o f counterbattery and antipersonnel miss ions . 
Friendly weapons strength (FWS) i s an auxi l ia ry var iab le composed 
o f the strength l eve l s for each of the f r iendly weapons systems. 
FWS = TSH60 + TSH81 + TSH42 + TSHH 
where TSH60 i s the current number o f operating 60 mm mortars, TSH81 i s 
the current number o f 81 mm mortars, TSH42 i s the current number o f 4 .2 
inch mortars, and TSHH i s the current number o f howitzers . 
These weapons strengths are con t ro l l ed by los s and replacement 
r a t e s , for example, the 60 mm mortar loss rate (L60R) and the 60 mm re ­
placement rate (R60R). Because only one weapon s i t e w i l l be f i red on at 
a time, we must s e l ec t the target as wel l as consider a p robab i l i ty o f 
weapon k i l l . Hence, a f r iendly weapon loss rate (FWLR) i s def ined. FWLR 
i s the current general weapon los s rate and one o f the four f r iendly wea­
pons w i l l be se lec ted to equal FWLR. The rule by which th is dec is ion i s 
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made i s : That weapons s i t e which f i red the most rounds in the period JK 
i s the se lec ted counterbattery ta rget . This rule i s used because counter­
battery f i r e i s assumed to be based on the output o f a countermortar ra­
dar set and the target i t i s most l i k e l y to find i s the target which puts 
up the most rounds. The same dec is ion process determines R81L, R42L, and 
RHL. At the same time, the same dec i s ion c r i t e r i a are used to determine 
whether or not the target loca t ion i s the 60 mm mortar s i t e , the 81 mm 
mortar s i t e , the 4 .2 inch mortar s i t e , or the howitzer s i t e . While th is 
dec is ion i s made in the movement s ec t i on , we w i l l mention i t here since 
i t i s e ssen t ia l that the cho ices be exac t ly p a r a l l e l . 
So far we have defined the dec is ion rule for f i r i n g a counter­
battery mission and the dec is ion rule for picking the target s i t e and 
target weapons strength l e v e l . I t remains to determine whether or not a 
weapons loss w i l l occur . 
Just as the troop loss rate w i l l include random var iab les based 
on weapons accuracy and adjustment delay t ime, the weapons loss rate in ­
cludes a random v a r i a b l e . The weapon accuracy i s s t i l l random, but more 
important, the counterbattery mission i s normally unobserved. Only the 
countermortar radar data are ava i l ab l e . We can consider that each f i r i ng 
s i t e cons i s t s o f the weapons and a f i r e cont ro l center . These elements 
are always separated enough to insure one h i t w i l l not destroy two e l e ­
ments. Therefore, we can approximate th is target with a ser ies o f 
po in t s , one for each weapon plus one for the f i r e con t ro l center . Since 
these pos i t ions are normally unprotected, any impact within the e f f e c t i v e 
burst ing radius for the round f i red of a weapon w i l l cause des t ruc t ion . 
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Let us assume for s impl ic i ty that, i f a h i t occurs , i t w i l l involve only 
one weapon. A typ ica l d i spos i t ion o f a four weapon battery i s shown in 
Figure 11 where the weapons are separated by their own e f f e c t i v e burst­




jj represents weapon loca t ion 
p represents the f i r e con t ro l center loca t ion 
Figure 11 . Typical Battery Disposi t ion 
Now countermortar radar might choose any o f the weapons as the target 
center so the enemy sheath may be centered on any o f the four target 
weapons and i t would seem that a l l f r iendly weapons are equally l i k e l y 
to be target center . I f we define the counterbattery target to be the 
area which includes a l l rounds l i k e l y to be f i red on radar information, 
then we can approximate the p robab i l i ty o f a h i t with the ra t io o f the 
area covered by the fr iendly sheath to the target area. The f r iendly 
sheath area i s the number o f weapons f i r i ng (FWSH) times the area included 
in one average burst (FEBD) and the target area i s approximately twice the 
area o f the target sheath plus the area o f the f i r ing sheath. The depth 
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of the target area w i l l be approximately twice FEBD because weapons are 








Figure 12. Approximation of Counterbattery Target 
Area and Firing Sheath Area 
So, by our assumptions, the weapons loss rate (FWLR) equals zero or one 
at any given time, depending on the probabi l i ty of a h i t . This prob­
a b i l i t y i s simulated by comparing the approximating probabi l i ty rat io 
with a random number of uniform distr ibut ion from zero to one. I f the 
random number i s less than the rat io value , then a h i t i s assumed and 
FWLR equals one. 
Since the target area equals the f i r ing sheath area plus the tar ­
get sheath area mult ipl ied by two, the rat io can never exceed one. I t 
must be noted in the above discussion that no consideration of personnel 
45 
casual t i es due to counterbattery f i re was made. This i s considered 
beyond the appropriate resolution level for this simulation since per­
sonnel serving indirect f i re weapons are part of the indirect f i r e system 
and are not troops in the sense that they can hold ground, attack, or de­
lay. The remaining variable in the enemy weapons strength subsystem i s 
the enemy weapons replacement rate (FWRR). 
Let us assume FWRR equals the friendly weapons loss ra te , delayed 
by the time necessary to bring a replacement weapon up to the f i r ing s i t e . 
This delay w i l l vary because of many fac tors , but l e t us assume i t takes 
12 hours to bring up the replacement weapon. The application of FWRR 
to the appropriate weapon strength level follows the same decision rule 
as for the loss rates . The DYNAMO equations for this subsystem are shown 
in Appendix D, and Figure 13 i s a diagram of this subsystem. 
Troop Strength Level 
Enemy troop strength (ETS) i s also a level or accumulation. I t 
i s the troop strength from the previous measurement time plus replacement 
and minus losses during the intervening time periods, as shown by the 
following equation. 
ETS.K = ETS.J + (DT)(ETRR.JK - ETLR.JK) 
Figure 14 i s a diagram showing the enemy troop strength. 
Figure 13. 60 mm Mortar Strength (TSH60) 
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Figure 14. Enemy Troop Strength 
To consider the entire system we would have to consider the re ­
placement rate ETRR, but the ef fect iveness of mixes of weapons can be 
compared without considering the replacement rate i f both are zero; so , 
for s impl i c i ty , l e t ETRR = 0 . Now, the enemy troop loss rate (ETLR) 
obviously depends on the number of fr iendly missions delivered (FMD), 
and on the exposure of the enemy troops (EE), but there i s more which 
must be considered. Some missions are more e f f ec t ive than others and 
this ef fect iveness i s a function of the number of weapons involved in 
f i r ing the mission, the e f f ec t ive bursting radius of the rounds f i r e d , 
the accuracy of the weapons, and the rapidity with which the mission i s 
del ivered. Certainly a mission f ired with four weapons should be more 
e f f ec t ive than a mission f ired with only two weapons of the same kind, 
and a round which covers a larger area has a larger chance of destroying 
a target . A l so , a mission which requires a long period of adjustment 
gives the enemy more time to seek cover and hence reduces the mission 
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e f fec t iveness . There i s a lso a large element of chance involved in each 
mission because one side frequently must guess at the location of the 
other side and because no weapon i s perfect ly accurate. So l e t us define 
the troop loss rate (ETLR) to equal FMET/DT, where FMET i s fr iendly mis­
sion ef fect iveness against troops. Now we can define FMET to be the 
product of a l l the factors bearing on the troop loss ra te . 
FMET = (CFMD)(FMP)(PETK)(EE)(ETD) 
CFMD i s the current fr iendly missions del ivered, FMP i s the friendly mis­
sion potent ia l , the sum of the mission potent ials for each weapon uni t , 
and PETK i s the probabi l i ty of a troop k i l l given that the intended tar ­
get i s h i t , EE i s the enemy exposure factor and depends on the role of 
the enemy force (attack, defend, or delay) and the fr iendly mission ad­
justment delay. ETD.K i s the enemy target density and re f l ec t s the number 
of enemy troops in the target area. The DYNAMO equations for th is sub­
system are shown in Appendix E. 
The Decision Functions 
We have now discussed a l l of the subsystems in the system. The 
previous subsystem, enemy troop strength, contains the var iables which we 
wish to compare and the other subsystems control them through decision 
functions which bring the other subsystems to bear on the troop strength 
subsystem. 
Mission Potential 
This factor brings the type weapon f i r ing each mission, the number 
of weapons f i r ing each mission, and the s ize of the area covered by each 
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burst to bear in FMET. This i s accomplished by summing the current po­
tent ia l for each weapon type: 
FMP = FMP60 + FMP81 + FMP42 + FMPH 
The mission potent ial development i s ident ica l for each weapon type so 
only FMP60 w i l l be traced. The reader i s reminded, however, that the 
same data i s developed, not only for each friendly weapon type, but also 
by a mirror image procedure on the enemy side of the model, Figure 15 . 
Figure 15. Friendly Mission Potential 
FMP60 = (EBD60)(WSH60)(OL60) 
Where EBD60 i s the e f f ec t ive bursting diameter, WSH60 i s the number of 
60 mm mortars in act ion, and OL60 i s an overlap factor to account for 
rounds from di f ferent weapons f a l l i n g on the same area. WSH60 brings 
control information to FMP as explained in the following paragraphs. 
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In the Friendly Weapons Subsystem, the number o f surviving weapons 
(TSH60) in the unit was developed. The Friendly Mission Potent ial Section 
modified this information through a ser ies o f con t ro l l i ng va r i ab l e s . I f 
the 60 mm unit i s ac t ive according to the FUA subsystem, then a new 
va r i ab l e , USH60, equals TSH60, otherwise USH60 equals ze ro . I f the unit 
i s not d i sp lac ing then another new var iab le (MSH60) equals USH60, but i f 
the unit i s displacing., the MSH60 equals USH60/2. This i s be cause ind i ­
rec t f i r e units d isplace in sec t ions to maintain f i r e coverage. The ammu­
ni t ion subsection exerts con t ro l in the same manner. A third new var iab le 
(ASH60) equals MSH60 i f there are any rounds on hand, otherwise ASH60 
equals ze ro . F ina l ly , range i s considered. I f the assigned target i s 
within range, WSH60, the var iable in the equation for FMP60, equals ASH60, 
but i f the target i s beyond range, WSH60 equals ze ro . Figure 16 gives a 
diagram for the mission potent ia l sec t ion and the DYNAMO equations for 
th is sect ion are shown in Appendix F. 
Mission Effect iveness 
The mission e f fec t iveness var iab le (FMET) i s the auxi l ia ry which 
brings a l l con t ro l l i ng dec is ions and functions together to a f f ec t the 
troop loss rate (ETLR). Mission e f fec t iveness i s the product o f mission 
poten t ia l (FMP) and missions del ivered (FMP), which we have already d i s ­
cussed, and three new factors which r e f l e c t the internal dynamics o f the 
target . These las t three fac tors are troop density (ETD), troop exposure 
(FE), and the p robab i l i ty o f target k i l l (PETK) (see Figure 17) . 
FMET = (FMP)(ETD)(FE)(PETK) 
Figure 16. Mission Potential Section 
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Figure 17. The Mission Effect iveness Variable 
We have been talking rather loosely about targets and target areas. To 
proceed further, we must be quite spec i f i c . Since we are taking the 
point of view of the r i f l e company commander, l e t us take the platoon as 
our basic target . We can then ta lk about the probabi l i ty of h i t t ing the 
platoon target and inside this platoon target we can describe the density 
of troops and ta lk about k i l l probabi l i t i e s in those terms. This i s based 
on a f a i r l y r e a l i s t i c assumption that companies w i l l always have frontages 
of a given s ize and platoons of another lesser s i z e , disregarding actual 
troop strength. This assumption cannot be fu l l y supported to extremes, 
but i t should be clear that mi l i tary tact ic ians maneuver platoons, com­
panies, and batta l ions and assume, unless forced by dire necess i ty to do 
otherwise, that these units are at f u l l strength. 
Troop Density. The density of troops in the target area i s a func­
tion of the enemy troop strength. I f we assume, as mentioned previously, 
that the frontage of each platoon w i l l remain constant and that troops are 
arrayed l i n e a r l y , then current troop density i s simply the rat io of current 
53 
troop strength to the length of the troop l ine . The troop l ine w i l l 
change, of course, as the role of the target force i s changed. I t i s ne­
cessary to consider target density because this i s a dynamic variable in 
the system which w i l l l imit the ef fect iveness of the enemy e f for t as time 
passes. Early target k i l l s w i l l lead to a reduced rate of target k i l l in 
the future as long as replacements are not received. 
Exposure. A mi l i tary unit in the f i e l d does what i t can to minimize 
exposure to enemy f i r e . In the defense, elaborate measures are taken i f a 
posit ion i s occupied for a suf f ic ient amount of time. In the of fense , ex­
posure i s reduced by choice of routes , movement at n ight , when poss ib le , 
and the use of suppressive f i re s when other e f for t s are not s u f f i c i e n t . 
For a l l of the e f for t s made to reduce exposure, there s t i l l remain tasks 
which cannot be accomplished without exposure. The attacking force must 
c lose with the defender's pos i t ion . The defender must patro l , repair , 
communicate, resupply, e t c . The delaying force must withdraw in addition 
to a l l the things the defending force must do. Because tasks which must 
be accomplished require exposure and some of those tasks can be deferred 
when an attack i s under way, the degree of exposure of the target force i s 
dynamic. When a suf f i c ient amount of time has passed without an attack, 
the need for resupply, communications, e t c . compels part of the force to 
be exposed, but an incoming round w i l l send a l l exposed personnel to what­
ever protection i s ava i lab le . The degree of exposure i s dependent on the 
amount of warning time, which we can equate to adjustment time. Given the 
platoon s ize target area we have defined and a typica l standing operating 
procedure (SOP), which spec i f ies the percentage of the force to be exposed 
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at a given time, we can rather accurately describe the relat ionship of 
exposure to adjustment time. 
For a defending force le t us assume a typical SOP allowing 50 per­
cent of the force to perform exposed tasks at a time. Then, at the instant 
of a f i r s t round impact near the target , we can expect 50 percent of the 
target force to be exposed. For a short period that leve l of exposure 
w i l l decrease unt i l a l l exposed troops have reached cover, at which time 
the degree of exposure w i l l become steady at the minimum exposure the pre­
pared posi t ions o f f e r . After a suf f ic ient period of time with no rounds 
f a l l i n g , the need for task accomplishment w i l l force personnel out to ex­
posed locations again. For a delaying target force , much the same procedure 
i s followed except that , when the attacker c loses to a prescribed distance, 
the delaying force must withdraw, causing a period of high exposure. For 
an attacking force , the leve l of exposure remains high except that the a t ­
tacking force can increase i t s speed and thereby become more d i f f i c u l t to 
h i t . The minimum exposure varies with r o l e . Attacking troops are inev i t ­
ably exposed to a high degree, while d e f e n d i n g troops can have a very low 
level of exposure i f suf f ic ient time has passed to build elaborate f o r t i ­
f i c a t i o n s . So we must l e t EE equal an attack exposure value (EEA), a de­
fending exposure value (EED), or a delaying exposure value (EDL), EE 
equals a maximum exposure as long as missions are directed away from the 
target area ( i . e . , counterbattery f i r e ) . When f i r e s tarts f a l l i n g on the 
troop target , exposure i s assumed to react as shown in Figures 18, 19, 
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Figure 18. Attack Exposure as a Function of Adjustment Time 
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Figure 19. Defense Exposure as a Function of Adjustment Time 
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Figure 20 . Delay Exposure as a Function of Adjustment Time 
In the case of exposure of a delaying target force , only hasty defensive 
posi t ions w i l l be prepared, hence the higher minimum exposure l e v e l s . 
Because of the added hazard due to hasty pos i t ions , the delaying force 
w i l l stay c loser to what protection i t has, thus a quicker drop to minimum 
exposure. MRA i s the current range between opposing forces and i s gener­
ated by the movement section. When MRA is less than 1000 meters, the de­
laying force withdraws,. The mirror image of this section i s FE, fr iendly 
troop exposure, and i s developed i d e n t i c a l l y . 
Probabil i ty of Troop K i l l . PETK attempts to consider the stochas­
t i c var iables involved in bringing indirect f i r e to bear. In Chapter I I I 
we discussed an extension of Bonder's probabi l i ty of a target k i l l and 
three random variables af fect ing the k i l l probabi l i ty for indirect f i r e 
systems, the probabi l i ty of target hit (or more prec ise ly P(N ^ X ) ) , the 
probabi l i ty that the target area i s occupied, and the probabi l i ty of a 
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target k i l l given the f i r s t two. Since the number o f rounds in adjustment 
to h i t the target a f f ec t s the system through the time delay i t generates, 
P(N ^ X) determined the value of FN, the number o f adjustments in the sec ­
t ion on f i r e miss ions . Dynamic input to the p robab i l i ty o f target area 
occupation would be in the form o f react ion to an incoming f i r e miss ion. 
We w i l l consider the " f ine" react ions o f reducing exposure l a t e r , but the 
"gross" react ion of moving away from the impact area i s beyond the r e so lu ­
t ion leve l o f this simulation, hence an assumption o f independence for PTAO, 
the p robab i l i ty o f target area occupat ion, i s not inappropriate . We can 
define PETK to be 
PETK = (PTAO)(PTEK) 
where PTAO i s the p robab i l i ty o f target area occupation and PTEK i s the 
p robab i l i t y o f a k i l l on an occupied target (Figure 2 1 ) . 
Figure 21. Probabi l i ty o f Target K i l l 
There i s no data ava i lab le on how many missions are f i red on un­
occupied targets for the obvious reason that i t i s frequently impossible to 
v i s i t a target area soon af ter a mission i s f i r e d , but some useful assump-
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t ions can be made based on the author 's mi l i t a ry training and exper ience. 
Let us define the s i tuat ions in which missions are f i red and then estimate 
the frequency with which these s i tuat ions occur and the p robab i l i ty o f tar­
get area occupation for each s i tua t ion . The s i tuat ions which we want to 
define are best described as l eve l s o f c o n t r o l . Let us s tar t with observed 
f i r e , in which a forward observer maintains v i sua l contact with not only 
the target area but also the enemy force throughout the mission. The 
opposi te o f th is i s unobserved f i r e in which the target area may be ob ­
served but no v isua l contact with enemy force e x i s t s . In the middle o f 
these two le t us define planned f i r e in which v isua l contact may not be 
gained with e i ther the target s i t e or the enemy f o r c e , but previous contact 
has allowed reg is t ra t ion and there i s good reason to expect the enemy w i l l 
occupy or pass through the ta rge t . Let SO represent the p robab i l i ty o f 
target area occupation under observed f i r e , SP the same p robab i l i ty under 
planned f i r e , and SU the p robab i l i ty under unobserved f i r e . Now l e t us 
assume that most missions are f i red on observed targets and on planned tar­
gets next and estimate the fol lowing frequency o f target type occurrence . 
Table 2 . Assumed Dist r ibut ion o f Missions 







For the observed target we must say that PTAO equals 1.0 because 
we could not c a l l i t an observed target by our de f in i t i on i f i t were not 
occupied . So, SO equals one. For the planned ta rge t , a d i f fe rence seems 
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l o g i c a l depending on the ro le o f the target f o r c e . I f the target force i s 
a t tacking, then i t seems l i k e l y that the force w i l l move through the target 
s i t e , but for a defending target the planner cannot expect the target to 
move in to the target s i t e . An estimate of PTAO = 0.9 i f the target force 
i s attacking and 0.7 otherwise seems appropriate. For the unobserved tar­
get i t again seems l o g i c a l to expect a d i f fe rence between an attacking force 
and a defending f o r c e , but the p robab i l i ty should be considerably lower, 
say 0 . 5 , i f the target i s attacking and 0.4 i f the target i s defending, 
see Figure 22 for a diagram of th is p r o b a b i l i t y . 
Figure 22. Probabi l i ty o f Target Area Occupation 
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PTEK i s ba s i ca l l y the ra t io o f the actual length o f the troop l ine which a 
given burst in tercepts to the maximum length i t might i n t e rcep t . Whether 
the ro l e o f the target force i s a t tack, delay, or defend, the troops w i l l 
be arrayed in a general ly l inear conf igura t ion . In the assaul t , troops 
are formed in a l ine to give maximum f i r e power to the front (Figure 2 3 ) . 
Figure 23. Typical Company Assault (Two Platoons Leading) 
The above f igure shows a company assault with two platoons committed, one 
in reserve . Note the l inear arrangement o f a l l three p la toons . In the 
delay or defense, troop pos i t ions are a lso arranged l inear ly within the 
target area. Figure 24 uses the standard symbols for platoons in a de­
fensive p o s i t i o n . The actual troop pos i t ions are on the forward edge of 
the symbols with only the command group back within the symbol. 
Figure 24. Typical Company Defense 
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By simplifying to say that a l l troops are arranged l inear ly regard­
less of r o l e , we can eas i ly approximate the length of the troop l ine which 
i s intercepted by the bursting round. Each high explosive round has an 
e f f ec t ive bursting diameter, EBD, which i s the diameter of a c i r c l e along 
the perimeter of which 90 percent of the targets exposed w i l l be h i t . I f 
we assume that a l l targets exposed inside w i l l be h i t and none outs ide , 
then we can use the c i r c l e described by the appropriate EBD and an impact 
point to determine the length of the troop l ine which has been intercepted, 
Figure 25 . 
TROOP LINE 
Figure 25 . Length of Troop Line Intercepted by Burst 
I f D i s the shortest distance between the point of impact and the troop 
l ine then by trinonometry: 
TL/2 = (EBD)/2) COS (2PI)(D/EBD/2) 
or s implifying: 
TL = EBD COS (2PI)(2D/EBD) 
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PTEK then equals the rat io of TL to EBD as long as the cosine function i s 
in the f i r s t quadrant (that i s , D i s less than EBD/2). When D i s greater 
than EBD/2, PTEK must equal zero. I t remains to determine a value for EBD 
and D. Since the mix of rounds f a l l i n g on the target w i l l vary from one 
time interval to another, no single EBD can be used. The most appropri­
ate value seems to be the average for a l l weapons f i r i n g . This gives us 
the resu l t s to be expected from a system of ident ica l weapons with ident i ­
cal EBD f i r ing in sheath. Proper control of the real system w i l l give the 
sheath e f f ec t we assume, so no great loss in accuracy should be caused by 
these approximations. (Diagrams are given in Figures 26 and 2 7 . ) 
4 . 2 inch SHEATH 
Figure 26 . Hypothetical Real Impact Behavior 
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Figure 27. Model Approximation of Impact Behavior 
The approximation would be unsuitable , however, i f the t o t a l sheath length 
were ever to exceed the length of the target l i n e . In th i s problem, the 
sum of the frontages of the target platoons i s never exceeded by the poten­
t i a l sum of the e f f ec t ive bursting diameter. For the attack, a platoon 
frontage i s expected to be about 200 meters. Three platoons give a t o t a l 
troop l ine length of 600 meters. For the defense platoon, frontage i s ex­
pected to be about 400 meters, giving a t o t a l troop l ine length of 1200 
meters. Platoon frontage in the delaying role i s even greater than that 
for the defense. I f we take the number of weapons in our present system 
and replace each weapon with the 4 . 2 inch mortar (which has the largest 
e f f e c t i v e bursting diameter of 40 meters ) , then we get 14- times 40 meters 
or 560 meters t o t a l , which i s l ess than the t o t a l platoon frontage at i t s 
l e a s t . Thus, we can take the average e f f ec t ive bursting diameter for the 
missions being delivered and disregard the p o s s i b i l i t y of exceeding the 
length of our hypothetical troop l i n e . Let the current average e f f e c t i v e 
bursting diameter for fr iendly f i r e s by FEBD. Then 
FEBD = (l/FBFA)(FMP) 
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where FBFA i s the number of weapons current ly f i r i n g . The displacement 
o f the burst from the troop l i n e , D, we w i l l c a l l FD. This i s because i t 
i s a function of the accuracy of the weapon system and we must d i f f e ren ­
t i a t e between f r iendly and enemy systems which are operating concurrent ly . 
FD i s a random var iab le dependent on the accuracy of the weapons system. 
This var iab le i s universa l ly accepted as normally d is t r ibuted with a mean 
of zero and a standard deviat ion o f CEP ( c i r cu l a r error probable) which 
i s published for each weapon type. Since we may have several weapons f i r ­
ing , we must again average the current displacement and CEP. Let FCEP 
be the average c i r cu la r error probable, then 
FCEP.K = (l/FBFA)(FCP60 + FCP81 + FCP42 + FCPH) 
where 
FCP60 = (CEP60) (WSH60) 
A diagram o f the p robab i l i ty o f target k i l l i s given in Figure 28 and 
the DYNAMO equations for th is sec t ion are shown in Appendix G. 
Signif icant Differences Between the Friendly and the Enemy Models 
As discussed prev ious ly , the f r iendly and the enemy models in th is 
simulation are s t ruc tura l ly i d e n t i c a l . Differences ex i s t because of two 
f a c t o r s : enemy equipment and common t a c t i c a l procedures. 
While the f r iendly force in our model i s equipped with the weapons 
the Infantry Board wishes to cons ide r , the enemy force must be equipped 
with weapons which our tested weapons might be expected to f ace . I t i s 
not unl ike ly at a l l that the f r iendly weapons we are tes t ing might be f i r ed 
Figure 28. Probabi l i ty o f Target K i l l Section 
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upon by any enemy weapon, but, i f enemy weapons which normally f i re from 
s i t e s beyond the range of our fr iendly weapons were included, then i t 
would be necessary to consider fr iendly weapons of suf f i c ient range to 
counter them. Unless we assume (not too unreasonably) that the e f f ec t s of 
weapons of greater range than those being considered w i l l balance each 
other, then we must ult imately include every weapon in the opposing arse­
na l s . This assumption i s made here, and the only weapons included in the 
enemy force are the l ight mortar, the heavy mortar, and the gun howitzer. 
These are not real weapons. The se lect ion of real enemy weapons 
would involve s trateg ic considerations far beyond the purpose of this 
study and would reduce usefulness by being too spec i f i c . Because th i s 
country does have several d i f ferent potent ia l opponents, a subject ive ap­
proximation has been made. The U. S. Army has approached the problem of 
mult iple potent ia l opponents by creating a f i c t i t i o u s opponent for t ra in­
ing purposes. This opponent, known as the Aggressor Army, i s a composite 
of the most s igni f icant features of the several potent ia l opponents and 
i s kept up to date to insure that tac t i c s and techniques developed in 
training are r e a l i s t i c ( 2 3 ) . The weapons employed by the'enemy force of 
our study are those of the hypothetical Aggressor Army which are employed 
at company, ba t ta l ion , and regimental l e v e l s . In the enemy force , then, 
there are only three di f ferent types of weapons and they are deployed and 
control led as fo l lows . The l ight mortar i s deployed and control led at 
battal ion leve l with s ix weapons in the f i r ing bat tery . The heavy mortar 
i s deployed and control led at regimental level with s ix weapons in the 
bat tery . The gun-howitzers are deployed at regimental leve l and control led 
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at d iv i s ion leve l with s ix weapons in the bat tery . 
The other d i f fe rence between the two subsystems i s that , while the 
f r iendly force remains constant in terms of organization at company l e v e l , 
the enemy force changes with r o l e . I t i s a wel l known t a c t i c a l rule of 
thumb that an attacking force should have three times the strength and 
firepower o f i t s defending opponent. This i s to insure success while 
overcoming the disadvantage of exposure we discussed e a r l i e r . In order to 
keep the f r iendly force constant , the enemy force i s va r ied . I f the 
f r iendly force i s a t tacking, then the enemy strength and number o f weapons 
i s that o f a p la toon, because presumably a company would not be ca l l ed upon 
to attack a larger f o r c e . On the other hand, i f the f r iendly company i s 
defending, then the enemy force has the strength and weapons d i s t r ibu t ion 
o f a ba t t a l ion , because a company should expect to be attacked by a bat­
ta l ion under the three- to-one rule o f thumb. 
Movement and Terrain 
This sect ion takes input data which speci fy t a c t i c a l r o l e s , terrain 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , and i n i t i a l loca t ions for each target and f i r i ng s i t e and 
generates l o c a t i o n s , rates o f movement, and ranges for each target or f i r ­
ing s i t e . 
Tac t i ca l Decision Rules 
The movement o f the f r iendly troop pos i t ion (the r i f l e company) 
w i l l be represented by the movement o f the center of mass o f the un i t . 
There are doc t r ina l rules for movement here which are r e l a t i v e l y easy to 
simulate as long as the rules are obeyed by the real un i t . We w i l l assume 
that these rules w i l l be obeyed. 
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The fr iendly unit w i l l e ither advance or withdraw. We w i l l make 
this decision exogenously by assigning a value to a switch variable SREF: 
SREF = 1 implies forward motion for the fr iendly unit 
SREF = -1 implies withdrawal for the fr iendly uni t . 
I f the fr iendly unit i s advancing, then the s i tuation w i l l d ictate 
the rate of advance and the t a c t i c a l state of the advance. An advance can 
be e i ther an attack or an explo i ta t ion . An attack i s a del iberate and 
cautious advance in strength to seize occupied pos i t ions . In th i s case , 
the rate of movement for a r i f l e company w i l l be approximately a slow 
walk or about 1000 meters per hour. An exploi tat ion i s a bold tac t i c for 
use against a weakened enemy, intended to encircle and destroy him. The 
rate of advance here usually depends on the a v a i l a b i l i t y of v e h i c l e s , since 
i t i s a lso usually a movement of long distance. The average rate of move­
ment here w i l l be about the rate at which a vehic le can proceed overland 
(that i s , o f f the road) or about 5000 meters per hour. The fr iendly unit 
may also not at tack, of course, in which case the rate i s zero. This 
decision also w i l l be made exogenously through another set of switch 
v a r i a b l e s . 
SR = 0 implies exploi tat ion (average 5000 meters per hour) 
SR = 1 implies decision to be made by SSR 
SSR = 1 implies 0 meters per hour 
SSR = 0 implies attack (average 1000 meters per hour) 
These input var iables are applied through decision equations which set ROLE 
equal to 5000 i f SR equals zero and a dummy v a r i a b l e , OROL, i f not . OROL 
69 
then equals 1000 i f SSR equals zero, and sets OROL equal to zero i f SSR 
does not equal zero. ROLE i s the average rate of movement and OROL i s a 
dummy variable which allows ROLE to have three a l ternat ive va lues . 
I f the fr iendly unit i s advancing, the above covers the doctrinal 
rules for the s i tuat ion . I f the fr iendly unit i s withdrawing, however, 
the rules of motion are more complicated. A unit which i s withdrawing i s 
somewhat dependent on the enemy's rate of advance; however, for s impl ic i ty , 
we w i l l l e t the enemy troop movement be the mirror image of the fr iendly 
uni t . That i s , we w i l l l e t the average rate of advance for the enemy 
units be the same as the fr iendly unit for both the attack and the explo i ­
ta t ion . Then we can l e t the average rates of withdrawal for the fr iendly 
unit also be zero, 1000, or 5000 meters per hour, depending on the defensive 
t a c t i c s . We can then pick the defense t a c t i c s exogenously by se lect ing 
a set of r u l e s . These defensive doctrinal rules are as fo l lows: I f a 
defense i s ordered, then the average rate of movement i s zero for the de­
fending uni t . In application th is would presumably be true unless the de­
fense were unsuccessful , in which case some decision on withdrawal would 
actual ly be made rather than allowing the unit to be l o s t . In r e a l i t y , 
the reserve would probably be committed to counterattack and restore the 
pos i t ion , but we are interested in the f i r e support element of b a t t l e and 
i t s e f f ec t on a r i f l e company, so the introduction of reserves , while tac­
t i c a l l y meaningful, w i l l t e l l us nothing about the e f f e c t of indirect f i r e 
on the r i f l e company in defense. Addi t iona l ly , i f the counterattack we 
have discussed were to f a i l , we would s t i l l need a decision rule for with­
drawal from a defensive pos i t ion . We w i l l assume the following decision 
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ru le : Penetration of a defensive posit ion by twenty or more meters w i l l 
cause the posit ion to be abandoned. 
Of course, the defense i s not the only retrograde t a c t i c . The de­
fensive unit may conduct delaying t a c t i c s in which i t i s intended to give 
up pos i t ions . In this case, the defensive unit occupies a posit ion unt i l 
the attacker comes within small arms range, at which time the defensive 
unit withdraws to another defendable pos i t ion . Because we are assuming 
that the posit ion defense tac t ic includes a withdrawal decision r u l e , the 
difference in this simulation between defense and delay i s the withdrawal 
decision rule and the rate of measurement. 
The withdrawal i s the mirror, for our purposes of the explo i ta t ion . 
I t i s movement to the rear as quickly as poss ible in order to avoid anni­
h i l a t i o n . Presumably, i t i s a rapid movement to reach a good defendable 
pos i t ion , but at the point where a defendable posi t ion i s reached, th i s 
t ac t i c i s dropped and defense or delay i s conducted, so we w i l l consider 
withdrawal to be a movement at maximum speed without delaying act ions . 
Each delaying action or defense involves the decision to stop and 
the decision to move back again. We have discussed the decision to begin 
movement. The decision to stop and occupy a posi t ion i s based in part on 
terrain . We w i l l assume that the defending force w i l l occupy the mi l i tary 
crest of each succeeding ridge and then approximate that posit ion by de­
f ining i t to be the contour l ine on the ridge seven eighths of the way up 
the r i s ing ground. A diagram of ro le switches i s given in Figure 29. 
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Figure 29. Role Switches 
Terrain 
The environment invariably has a profound effect in combat actions. 
If affects the frequency and duration of actions in the daily change from 
day to night. It may hinder, help, or prevent action as weather factors 
often do. The single most important environmental element, and the only 
one considered in the model, is the terrain. The nature of the terrain 
is, itself, frequently as important an element of a tactical decision as is 
the nature of the enemy. In many ways, use of terrain may be a dominant 
consideration, with tactics and man made equipment occupying a supporting 
role. The commander who must defend or delay will use the terrain to his 
best advantage, and will use obstacles and troop positions to complement 
the obstacles created by the terrain. The commander who must attack will 
find his tactics and equipment choices dictated by terrain. For example, 
armored forces must be used on flat terrain because infantry forces would 
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be too exposed. Infantry must be used in rough or mountainous terrain 
because armored equipment becomes road bound and, hence, too exposed. De­
fensive posi t ions and attack object ives are chosen based, at the t a c t i c a l 
l e v e l , on terrain considerations, because high ground can be used to domi­
nate lower ground. 
More general simulations such as IUA consider terrain to a very 
high resolution by simulating actual terra in . For example, the terrain 
model for IUA i s b u i l t to careful ly reproduce the Fulda Gap area of Ger­
many, where the opening bat t l e s of World War I , World War I I , and the 
Battle of the Bulge occurred. While th is location i s h i s t o r i c a l l y proven 
to be s t r a t e g i c a l l y important, a terrain model based exclus ively on th is 
terrain w i l l not r e f l e c t very wel l the terrain of South Vietnam, or North 
Afr i ca , or even Austr ia , which i s r e l a t i v e l y c lose at hand. 
The terrain model for th i s simulation, while lacking the resolution 
of a simulation l ike IUA, has considerably more f l e x i b i l i t y . The IUA model 
considers terrain to consist of three leve ls of complexity, the gross fea­
tures e a s i l y ident i f i ed as h i l l s , ridge l i n e s , and v a l l e y s , the irregu­
l a r i t i e s in these features such as g u l l i e s , outcroppings, and spurs, and 
the roughness character i s t i cs such as rocks, vegetat ion, boulders, bu i ld ­
ings , e tc . This simulation uses a s imilar breakdown to consider the e l e ­
ments of terrain important to t a c t i c a l dec i s ions . I t does so with less 
reso lut ion , however, because, while the IUA model i s l imited to one p lace , 
th i s model i s l imited to one type of dominant terrain feature , the ridge 
and v a l l e y complex. The a l t i tude of these ridges and the distance between 
them may be set at any desired leve l through input data. The source of 
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this gross topography is a cosine function. Intermediate features are 
generated by another cosine function of variable period and amplitude and 
the roughness is generated by a uniformly distributed random number gener­
ator of controllable range. This information is generated as elevation 
and slope date for each target location and firing site. The input terrain 
variables are as follows: TAVZ is the average elevation. For all test 
runs, TAVZ was set at 1000. TZ is the gross variation of ridge height. 
For test runs, TZ was set at 500 so that elevations run from about 500 to 
1500 meters. TROL is the average level of roughness and was set for tests 
at 10 meters. TRND is the range of variation for the roughness character­
istic and was set at 10. Due to a characteristic of the DYNAMO equation 
for uniformly distributed random numbers, this allows a uniform random var­
iation from 0 to plus or minus 5 meters. TPP is the period of the gross 
cosine wave, or the gross distance between ridge tops. For test runs, 
TPP was set at 2000 meters. TPPP is the period of the secondary features 
and was set at 100 meters for tests. The above input variables are com­
bined as follows for all elevation equations: 
TPZ = TZ + TPZZ 
where TPZ is the current maximum ridge height; 
TPZZ + (TZZ) COS ((2PI)(1)/TPPP) 
where TPZZ is the current maximum variation in secondary roughness; 
TZZ = TROL + TRNDO 
where TZZ is the current roughness variation; and 
TRNDO = (TRND) NOISE 
where TRNDO is the current value of the random number generator. 
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Because of another character i s t ic of DYNAMO, the values of TRNDO w i l l be 
ident ica l from run to run. Hence, the terrain model w i l l be ident ica l 
among runs as long as terrain sett ings are not changed. This set of 
equations with values indicated generates a terrain pro f i l e s imilar to 








Figure 30. Prof i le Sketch of Simulated Terrain 
TPZ and TPP are used in the computation of current elevation and slope 
for each target and f i r ing s i t e . 
f TROL I -~ - > / TZZ j 
V _ ^ / ^ X \ _ y ^ / TRNDO j 
J M S * \ . ' \ ^ Y 
Figure 31 . Current Maximum Ridge Height (TPZ) 
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Troop Target Locations 
The fr iendly and enemy troop location modules are ident ica l in 
structure. The only difference i s the change in sign of SREF, the attack-
withdraw role selector,. We w i l l develop the enemy troop locat ion , ETG, 
since a l l previous discussion has taken the enemy troop location as the 
troop target . 
The i n i t i a l location i s an input and was specif ied for t e s t s as 
ETG = X + 10500 
where X i s a common reference point and was set for t e s t s at X = 5000 
ETG.K = ETG.J + (DT)(ERTU.JK - 0) 
ERTU i s the rate of movement, which may be pos i t ive or negative depending 
on SREF. 
ERTU = (SREF)(ERTUU) 
ERTUU = CLIP (ERTA, EFDP, 0 , SREF) 
ERTA i s the current attack movement ra te , EFDP is the current retrograde 
movement ra te . 
ERTA = CLIP (ERT1, ERTA1, MRA, 460) 
MRA i s the current distance between troop locat ions . ERTA equals e i ther 
ERT1, i f MRA i s greater than 400 meters, or ERTA1 i f MRA i s less than 460 
meters. Four hundred s ix ty meters i s maximum small arms range. This de­
cis ion re f l ec t s more cautious movement when attacking under small arms 
f i r e . 
ERT1 = R0L1 + (R0L2)(SLETG) 
R0L1 i s the average rate of movement from the role switches. 
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R0L1 = 1 + ROLE 
ROL2 = ROLE/2 
ROL2 i s the amplitude of the slope control led portion of the current 
movement rate . 
SLETG = ( -1) SIN ((2PI)(ETG/TPP) 
SLETG i s the current slope of the terrain at ETG. I t i s the f i r s t de­
r ivat ive of ELETG, the current elevation of ETG which w i l l be developed 
l a t e r . 
ERTA1 = 1000 
This r e f l e c t s the reduction to attack rate i f the i n i t i a l rate of move­
ment was that assigned to the explo i ta t ion . This completes the decision 
structure among attacking ra te s . 
The reader w i l l r eca l l that the retrograde movement rate i s repre­
sented by EFDP. 
EFDP = CLIP (ERTA, ETMC, MAR, MRA) 
I f MRA, the actual range, i s less than MAR, the minimum acceptable range, 
then EFDP equals ERTA, or the attack and withdrawal rates are the same. 
As long as MRA i s greater than MAR, then EFDP equals ETMC. ETMC i s another 
decision variable which w i l l cause the defending or delaying force to stop 
at the mi l i tary crest of a r idge . 
ETMC = CLIP (ETOP, ERTA, ELETG, TMZ) 
I f ELETG, the current elevation of ETG i s greater than TMZ, then ETMC 
equals ETOP. 
77 
ELETG = ELEET + TAVE 
ELEET = (TPZ) COS ((2PI)(ETG/TPP) 
Otherwise, ETMC equals ERTA the attack rate . 
TMZ = (TMZZ)(7)/8 
TMZZ TAVZ + TPZ 
TMZ i s the maximum elevation which might ex i s t but for the cosine func­
t ion . This puts the defensive posit ion at the mi l i tary crest of the 
r idge , but might also se lect the wrong s lope; so another decision variable 
(ETOP) i s used to insure the defensive posit ion i s on r i s ing ground with 
respect to the direction of movement. Figure 32 i s a sketch of the m i l i ­
tary crest approximation and Figure 33 i s a diagram of the enemy target 
movement. 
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DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT 
Figure 32 . Mi l i t ary Crest Approximation 
ETOP = CLIP ( 0 , ERTA, ELETG.K, ELETG.J) 
Figure 33 . Enemy Target Movement 
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Weapons Locations 
All of the weapons locations are developed identically. We will 
discuss in detail only the module generating the 60 mm mortar location, 
X60. The initial location X60 is an input. For tests, X60 = 9400. 
X60.K - X60.J + (DT)(VEL60.KL - 0) 
where VEL60 is the movement rate and 
VEL60 - (SREF)(VEL60) 
Indirect fire units must displace occasionally either to avoid being 
overrun if their role is defensive or to stay within range if the role 
is offensive. Because it is desired that every unit be capable of firing 
at all times, the decision to move is made early enough that the unit can 
move in two echelons and keep half of the firing battery operational 
throughout the displacement period. This was discussed to some degree in 
the development of FMP, the friendly mission potential. The simulation 
equations approximate the logic involved in the displacement decision. 
The approximation is this: If the enemy role is attack, then displacement 
is begun when actual range to the friendly troops target is greater than 
or equal to three quarters of the maximum effective range for the light 
mortar. If the role is defense or delay, then displacement is begun when 
actual range to the friendly troops target is greater than or equal to 
three quarters of the maximum effective range for the light mortar. If 
the role is defense or delay, then displacement is begun when the actual 
range is less than one quarter of the maximum effective range. 
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To halt the displacement, the approximating decision rule is: In 
each case displace five twelfths of the maximum effective range. This 
puts the new firing site initially at a location where two thirds of the 
maximum effective range is available for use (see Figure 34 below). 
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Figure 34. Firing Site Displacement as a Function 
of Maximum Effective Range 
The input to this series of decisions is a dummy variable, V60. 
V60 = AV602 + (AV604)(SLX60) 
AV602 is one half the average displacement rate and AV60 is one fourth 
the average displacement rate. This halving is done to reflect the fact 
that two complete moves are made in each displacement and the displace­
ment time period is approximately twice the time to move once to the new 
site. 
AV602 = AV60/2 
AV604 = AV60/4 
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SLX60 is the current slope at X60 
SLX60 = (-1) SIN ((2PI)(X60/TPP) 
and AV60 is an input. For test runs, AV60 was set to equal ROLE, because 
the 60 mm mortar would normally be carried right with the troops. 
Other weapons location modules vary from this in the average move­
ment rate. For example, the enemy heavy mortar might be vehicle trans­
ported so that AVHM would be set equal to 15000, or about 10 miles per 
hour (see Figure 35 below). 
Figure 35. 60 mm Mortar Location 
Ranges for each weapon are computed as the following example for the 60 
mm mortars. 
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R60 = X60 - EETG 
where X60 i s the current 60 mm mortar location and EETG i s a current 
general target which may be any of the friendly targets . 
FFTG = CLIP (FCTG J FTG, RANDO, 800) 
FCTG i s a general counterbattery target i f RANDO i s greater than 800. 
Otherwise, FFTG equals FTG, the fr iendly troop target . This decision 
rule i s ident ica l to the mission switch rule in the Enemy Mission Effec­
t iveness sect ion, and the mirror image of the rules in the Friendly 
Mission Effect iveness section which we discussed e a r l i e r . FCTG equals X60 
i f the current rounds f ired for the 60 mm mortar i s greater than that 
f ired by the other enemy weapons un i t s , and likewise equals X81, X42, or 
XH i f that battery currently f ired the most rounds. 
The reader may observe in the Appendices that the logic and deci ­
sion var iables are ident ica l to those involved in se lect ing the spec i f ic 
weapons strength loss rate to which FSLR, the general fr iendly weapons 






Figures 36 and 37 show rep l i ca t ions o f the current standard mix 
superimposed. Each r ep l i ca t ion draws from a new and d i f fe ren t table o f 
random numbers, otherwise var iab les are i d e n t i c a l . A smoothed mean curve 
i s shown on top of the r ep l i ca t ion and comparison with the predicted model 
behavior o f Figure 6 implies a v a l i d program. Computer p lo t ted output i s 
shown in Appendix I . 
Test Mixes 
While the ultimate goal o f the Infantry Board i s to s e l ec t a best 
weapons mix, th is study w i l l only tes t se lec ted hypothet ica l mixes to 
evaluate the a b i l i t y o f the simulation to discriminate among mixes. In 
order to s e l ec t meaningful tes t mixes, we must consider some of the 
l i k e l y constra ints which the Infantry Board w i l l probably f ace . 
F i r s t , i t i s most l i k e l y that the present cos t l eve l s w i l l remain 
unchanged; therefore , no a l te rna t ive mix may exceed the cos t o f the current 
mix. 
Secondly, i t i s l i k e l y that only minimal changes in to ta l personnel 
strength w i l l be al lowed; there fore , l e t us assume no a l te rnat ive mix may 
exceed the present t o t a l number o f ind i rec t f i r e support personnel . 
Third, the primary organization o f the bat ta l ion w i l l not be changed. 
The cos t constra int i s highly complex and might wel l require another study 
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Figure 36. Validat ion Runs (Attack) 
TROOPS 
Figure 37. Validat ion Runs (Defense) 
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o f th is s ize to compute the actual operating c o s t s . Let us approximate 
the cos t constraint by using i n i t i a l equipment c o s t s . Since the rate of 
increase o f i n i t i a l cos t s increases as weapons range increases and the 
serv ices organization increases in the same way, this should be an 
acceptable assumption. The i n i t i a l cos t s (24) as o f 1 November 1971 for 
one complete weapon of each type are as f o l l o w s . 
Table 3. I n i t i a l Costs for Selected Weapons 
60 mm Mortar 635.00 
81 mm Mortar 2,333.00 
4 .2 inch Mortar 5,212.00 
105 mm Mortar 21,254.00 
The t o t a l value of the three 81 mm mortars, four 4 .2 inch mortars, and 
s ix 105 mm howitzers in the present system i s $152,120. The 60 mm mortar 
i s not considered because the present organizat ion does not include 60 ram 
mortars. So, the extreme mixes within this constraint are e i ther 250 each 
60 mm mortars or 65 each 81 mm mortars, or 29 each 4 .2 inch mortars, or 7 
each 105 mm howitzers . 
The crews for each weapon (22) are given below. 
Table 4 . Crew Strengths for Selected Weapons 
60 mm Mortar 4 
81 mm Mortar 6 
4 .2 inch Mortar 7 
105 mm howitzer 9 
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The to t a l personnel strength to serve a l l the weapons in the current 
organization model i s 136. The extreme mixes allowable within the person­
nel constra int are: 34 each 60 mm mortars, or 22 each 81 mm mortars, or 
19 each 4 .2 inch mortars, or 15 each 105 mm howitzers . 
The combination of both of the above constra ints l imit us to ex­
tremes of e i t he r : 34 each 60 mm mortars, or 22 each 81 mm mortars, or 19 
each 4 .2 inch mortars, or 7 each 105 mm howitzers . In order to best eva l ­
uate the discriminatory a b i l i t y o f the simulation l e t us se l ec t one ex­
treme mix and two mixes which represent only a small var ia t ion from the 
present mix. 
For the extreme example l e t us tes t the a l l 60 mm mortar al terna­
t ive at company l e v e l . Next le t us try el iminating the 81 mm mortar and 
replacing i t with 4 .2 inch mortars at ba t ta l ion l e v e l . For the f ina l ex­
ample mix l e t us remove two 4 .2 inch mortars from the ba t ta l ion and add 
81 mm mortars to each company. Table 5 shows the tes t mixes. 
Table 5. Test Weapons Mixes 
60 mm 81 mm 4 .2 inch 105 mm 
34 0 0 0 




Because of extreme l imi ta t ion in time to complete th is study and 
some technica l d i f f i c u l t i e s , there are only a few r ep l i ca t i ons o f each 
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tes t and resul ts had to be drawn from less than ideal data. I t had been 
hoped that some information could be gained from comparisons o f r e p l i c a ­
t ions with iden t i ca l random events , but th is proved i n f e a s i b l e . Analysis 
o f the fo l lowing runs i s therefore incomplete. 
The Al l 60 mm Mix 
Only two rep l i ca t ions o f this run are ava i l ab l e , but, because runs 
with iden t i ca l random data can be compared, i t was hoped some conclusions 
could be reached. The resul t s expected i n t u i t i v e l y from a mix o f th is ex­
treme nature are that heavier enemy losses would be caused early because 
o f the heavy f i r e power i n i t i a l l y avai lable on the enemy troop ta rge t , 
fol lowed by l igh te r enemy losses and heavier f r iendly losses in the la ter 
time periods because the 60 mm mortars do not have the range to destroy 
enemy ind i r ec t f i r e weapons, but w i l l themselves suffer a t t r i t i o n . The 
computer resu l t s shown in Figures 38 and 39 are somewhat disappoint ing. 
Because the time spacing o f losses i s dependent on the random var iables 
losses in the base and tes t mixes occur at the same time. We are there­
fore unable to compare the ear l iness o f losses d i r e c t l y . Comparison o f 
mean values for many r ep l i ca t i ons should show this r e l a t ionsh ip . When the 
loss does occur however, i t i s greater for the e a r l i e r event in the tes t 
mix. This agrees with our expec ta t ions . An unexplained resul t i s the 
ear ly higher losses for the f r iendly target in both r e p l i c a t i o n s . The de­
v ia t ion in behavior o f this mix from the base mix i s a lso not as severe 
as might be expected. Again, comparison o f mean curves would probably be 
more product ive . The expected behavior must be reexamined, o f course , but 
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Figure 39 . A l l 60 mm Mix, Run 2 
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The Increased 81 mm Mix 
This mix subst i tutes an added 81 mm mortar at company leve l for 
two less 4 . 2 inch mortars at batta l ion l eve l . I n t u i t i v e l y we should ex­
pect s l i g h t l y increased early enemy losses and s l i g h t l y decreased late 
enemy losses because quick reaction i s substituted for range. Figures 
4 0 , 4 1 , and 42 show the three repl icat ions of th is mix ava i lab le . In these 
runs increased early enemy losses do not appear, but decreased late enemy 
losses do appear. Friendly loss changes are contradictory. In two runs 
the i n i t i a l losses are greater , but in the third the i n i t i a l loss i s l e s s . 
The Increased 4 . 2 Inch Mix 
This mix subst i tutes an addit ional four 4 . 2 inch mortars at bat­
ta l ion l eve l for a l l 81 mm mortars at company l e v e l . The expected e f f ec t 
of th is change i s the substitution of increased f i r e power at medium 
ranges for a decreased quick reaction capabi l i ty . Enemy troop losses 
should be less at early times and greater at la ter times. Friendly troop 
losses should be unchanged early and less at la ter time. 
Again the few repl icat ions (see Figures 43-46) are not very con­
s i s t e n t . Early enemy losses are unchanged or less for a l l four rep l i ca ­
t ions but late enemy losses are contradictory. Early fr iendly losses are 
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FIGURE 46. INCREASED 4.2 INCH MIX, RUN 4 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusions 
I t i s apparent that comparison of mean curves representing many 
repl icat ions of each tes t mix must be made before any conclusion about the 
power of the model can be reached. Mean value curves could not be gen­
erated because of insuf f i c ient time. 
I t was hoped that comparison of t e s t to base mix runs with ident i ­
cal random events would show s igni f icant trends. In the case of the two 
repl icat ions of the a l l 60 mm mix both showed the expected early larger 
losses and la ter smaller l o s se s , but since there are only two repl icat ions 
th is i s not suf f ic ient to define a trend. In a l l three repl icat ions of 
the increased 81 mm mix expected early larger losses in the enemy strength 
did not occur, but la ter lesser enemy losses did occur. Expected unchanged 
early fr iendly losses were supported by inconsistent i n i t i a l loss changes. 
The var iat ions among these i n i t i a l loss values was greater than the var ia ­
tion among base mix repl icat ions of the same event, which suggests that 
random variat ion i s greater than variat ion due to mix changes. Late losses 
were inconsistent for both fr iendly and enemy forces . While i t appears 
that the model i s s u f f i c i e n t l y sens i t ive to troop strength to show var ia ­
t ions in comparison of mixes with random values f ixed , this s e n s i t i v i t y 
may not be suf f i c i ent to show s igni f icant changes when s t a t i s t i c a l analy­
s i s i s applied to mean curves and their variances . I f th i s i s the case 
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then improved resolu t ion may solve the problem, but a large variance in 
the frequency and values o f events such as weapons h i t s and troop k i l l s 
i s s trongly supported by experience and mi l i t a ry t ra in ing. 
Because DYNAMO provides an opportunity to compare r ep l i ca t i ons 
where each r ep l i ca t ion has f ixed random events for a l l mixes, the unusual 
opportunity to compare changes which are l e ss than s t a t i s t i c a l l y s ign i f ­
icant i s af forded. Although i t would be very tedious to do so , individual 
comparison o f each r ep l i ca t ion may be necessary i f s t a t i s t i c a l s i g n i f i ­
cances cannot be shown. In th is case , because the concept o f s t a t i s t i c a l 
s ign i f i cance i s overridden by this unique capab i l i t y o f DYNAMO, any trends 
which appear at that l eve l should be ser ious ly considered. 
Limitations 
While th is simulation may provide a dynamic capab i l i t y not ava i l ­
able in other mi l i t a ry models, i t w i l l have l imi ta t ions because o f scope , 
r e so lu t ion , and purpose. This model was developed to meet a s p e c i f i c 
need o f the Infantry Board. Because o f this modif ica t ion would be neces­
sary to apply the model to an armor problem, for example. Low reso lu t ion 
primarily takes the form of crude approximations for the random v a r i a b l e s . 
Since these random var iab les do have a highly s ign i f i can t e f f e c t on strength 
l e v e l s , their crude nature i s an important l imi t a t ion . These approxima­
t ions were accepted by the author, in part , because o f a lack o f time to 
complete the work, but a lso because o f the many gaps in necessary data. 
The provis ion o f accurate data on dec is ion delay times and other informa­
t ion o f th is nature would contr ibute to the need for be t te r reso lu t ion in 
the model. 
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A much greater l imita t ion o f this model i s the i n a b i l i t y to con­
s ider varying t a c t i c s and in tangibles such as e s p r i t . Were considerat ion 
o f these fac tors to be made, however, the model would probably increase in 
complexity three f o l d . 
Recommendations 
This study should be continued to obtain a conclusion with respect 
to the a b i l i t y o f the model to compare various weapons mixes. Suff ic ient 
reruns should be made to conduct a s t a t i s t i c a l ana lys i s . I f e f fec t iveness 
cannot be measured s t a t i s t i c a l l y based on mean value curves , then compar­
ison of mixes by individual r ep l i ca t ion should be made. 
I f the maximum potent ia l o f th is model i s to be r ea l i z ed , then ac­
curate information on dec is ion delay times, weapons serv ice t imes, re ­
supply t imes, and other organizat ional var iab les must be made ava i l ab le . 
Since th is kind o f information i s necessary to any dynamic study, a gen­
eral e f f o r t should be made by the defense community to gather and d i s t r i ­
bute th is kind of information. 
In th is model t a c t i c s were f ixed and organizat ional structure was 
allowed to vary. I t should be poss ib le and highly in te res t ing to hold 
organizat ion steady and vary t a c t i c s . I f th is could be done while main­
taining compatabil i ty with th is model, then a considerably more useful 
model would r e su l t . A dynamic model with th is range of c a p a b i l i t i e s should 
be par t i cu la r ly useful in studying the re la t ionsh ip between maneuver speed 
and f i r e power which Bonder discusses ( 2 0 ) . 
I t i s most d i f f i c u l t to account for the e f f e c t o f such fac tors as 
e spr i t on mi l i t a ry organiza t ions . Representation of the e f f e c t s o f morale, 
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or espr i t seems plaus ible in terms of varying degrees o f pos i t i ve and neg­
at ive feedback. Such a study would probably be highly explora tory , but 
even the crudest quanti tat ive representation o f these in tangibles might 
be o f great value i f only in providing a conceptual structure for further 





MISSION FLOW EQUATIONS 
A D Y N A M I C M G D F L O F A F I N E S U P P O R T R A T T L E 
ENEMY MLSSLUMFLOW 
1 L EMD.KSFMO, j + cDFKEMDfl. J K » 0 ) 
2 0 R E M D R . K L * C E M I P . K / E M C T t K 
7 A CEMLP,KSEMLP„K*EMIP,J 
12A EADL,K = (SMTA»K)(EN1 .K) 
8 A S M T A t K = T A , K * T S t K * T F . K 
7 A F M t K » E N . K - L 
6 A T A . K * 0 , 0 4 
•51 A TS .KSCLLP(0»0 . WRANOO .K# 1 5 0 ) 
2 0 A T F . K » R A T F t K / V F , K 5 1 A V F •KSCLLPC 3100MOOO#RAHM.K#MVHM) 
5 1 A R A T F . K S C L L P C P A H M . K ^ R A G t K ^ R A H M . K / M X H W ) 
5 1 A F N . K a C L T P < N L . K , N 2 . K t R A N D Q , K * 6 5 0 ) 
5 1 A N 2 . K » C L L P ( 3 # I M 3 . K * R A N D U t K # 6 0 0 ) 
5 1 A N 3 . K » C L I P C 4 # 5 » R A N D U . K , 3 3 3 ) 
3 3 A R A N D U , K = 500F( 1 0 0 0 ) N O I S E 
7 A EMCT.K*EADL.K+EVOL.K 
7 A E V O L . K « s T S . K * T F E # K 
1 L E M L P . K = E M L P . j 4 C D T ) ( E M A C R . J K « F M 0 R t J K ) 
2 0 R E M A C R . K L * E M A C 1 t K / H T 
5 4 A EMACl,K«MIN(FUI .K ,FM8 ,K) 
7A 6ui•KSEUA.K-FMLP.K 
U EMBTK*FMB.JK + (DT)(FMAR,JK-EMACR. J K ) 
gOR ^MAG.K^«FUA.K/KACD FRIFNDLY MISSION FLOW 
1L FMD t K*FMD,J4(DT )(FMDR . J K - 0 ) 
20R FMDR,KL*(CFMIP,K) /FMC T.K 
9A FMCT.K3FADL.K+FVDL,K 
7A F V D L . K * T S , R + T F . K 
19A FADL.K»(FN1•K ) (TA .K*TS • K + TFE • K + 0 ) 
7A FN 1# K*FN • K*1 
51A FN #K«CLIP(N1 . IO N2 ,K#RANDU . K # 6 5 0 ) 
20A T F E , K x R A T E , K / V E , K 
51A R A T F . K * C L l P ( R A H J K # R A 4 2 , ! O R A 4 2 , K > M X 4 2 ) 
51A V E . K * C L l P c 3 l O 0 # l 0 0 O , R A 4 2 t K # M X i 2 ) 
7A C F M l P . K s F M l P . K - F M l P . J 
1L F M l P . K * F M I p , J 4 ( 0 T ) ( F M A C R . J K - F M D R . J K ) 
20R F M A C R . K L f F M A C l t K / D T 
54A FMAC1 tKsMlN(FUl . K t F M B . K ) 
7A Fill . K « F U A f K-FMIP.K 
IL FMB,K»FMdtJ*(DT)(FMAR • JK-FMACR,JK) 




AMMUNITION FLOW EQUATIONS 
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ENEMY AMMUNITION LLEVEl 
1L EAELM,K=EAELM.J4(DT) (FAFLM.JK+0) 
LIGHT MORTAR AMMUNITION 
52L EALM.KsFALM.J*(QT HEADLM.JK-FAFLM.JK-EADRL.JK*0> 
21R E A r L M # K L a ( l / F M C T . K ) ( E N L M , K * W S H L . J ) 
49 A ENLM,K=S^ITCM(0>EN,K#FMPLM,K> 
6R EADRL.KL'C 
39R EADLM fKL = l)ELAY3(EARLM. JK,EASHL) 
§6R ^ A § P M ' K L * ( E A R L M , J K + E 0 L L M » F A L M . J ) / ( D I L K . K * 0 + O ) 
6A EDLLM.Ke300 
20A DILM»2 
HEAVY MORTAR AMMUNITION 
1L EAEHW.KsEAEHM. J + CDTKEAFHM. J K - O ) 
i t EAHM,K*FAHM t J*(DT)CEADHM,JK-FAFHM f JK) 
21R EAPHM.KL=C1/FMCT,K)CENHM.K+W5HM,J) 
49 A ENHM.R«SWITCHC0^EN.K#EMPHM.K1 
6R EADRLM.KLsO 
39R EADHM •KL«DELAY3CEARHM,JK#EASHM) 
C EASPM»4 




1L EAEG # KsEAEG. J-K DT ) C E AFG . JK-0 > 
52L EAG.KsEAG, j + CDT)(FADG.JK-EAFG.JK-EAORG.JKfO) 
21R EAFG.KLsC 1 / E M C T . K ) ( E N G . K 4 W S G . J ) 
49A ENG,KsSWllCHCO#EN,K>EMPG t K) 
S § R H B G ^ L b o ? L A Y 3 ( E A R G , J K # E A S D G ) 
C EASDG*3 
26R EARG.KL. = (EARG. J K * E D L G - E A G . J ) / ( D I G . K + 0 4 0 ) 
£A EDLG A Kc300 
20A DIG=2 
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F R I E N D L Y A M M U N I T I O N LEVEL 
60MM MORTAR AMMUNITION 
1L FAE6C,KrFAE6 0 . J + C D T ) C F A F 6 0 , J K » 0 ) 
2 6 R F A R 6 G . K L * C F A F 6 Q . J K + F D L 6 0 - F A 6 0 , J ) / ( C I 6 0 t K * 0 * 0 ) 
52L F A h O , K = F A 6 0 , J + C D T ) ( F A 0 6 0 . J K - F A F 6 G . J K - F A 0 R 6 . J K 4 0 ) 
2 1 R F A F 6 0 . K L » ( l / r M C T t K ) ( F N 6 0 . K 4 W 5 H 6 C t J ) 
49 A F N 6 0 , K s $ W I T C H ( 0 # F N . K # F M P 6 0 . K ) 
6 R F A D R 6 . K L S 0 
39R F A 0 6 C . K L s D E L A V 3 ( F A R 6 0 , J K , F A S 0 6 ) 
6 A F A S D 6 * 6 
C FDL6C»300 
2 6 R F A R f l l . K L * ( F A F f l l • JK + F D L M - F A 6 1 . J)/(DIfll t K * 0 * 0 ) 
6 A 0 1 6 0 = 2 
8 J MM AMMUNITION 
1L F A E B 1 . K s F A E 6 1 . J +(DT ) CFAF8 1 . J K - O ) 
5 2 L FA81 , K * F A t t l . J l + ( D T ) ( F ADA 1 . J K - F A F 8 1 . J K - F A 0 R 8 . J K * 0 ) 
2 1 R F A F 8 1 , K L * U / F M C T . K ) ( F K 8 1 , K * W S H 8 1 . J ) 
49 A F N 8 1 , K s S W l T C H ( 0 / F N . K * F M P f l l , K ) 
6R F A D R 8 , K L * 0 
3 9 R F A D 8 1 . K L » D E L A Y 3 ( F A R 8 l , J K . F A S n 8 ) 
C FASD8«6 
6A FDL81=300 
20A 0 l 8 l s 2 
4 . 2 IN AMMUNITION 
2 6 R F A M 2 . K L 5 ( F A F 4 2 . J K + F n L 4 2 - F A 4 ? . J ) / C D I 4 ? . K * 0 * 0 ) 
1L F A E 4 2 . K * F A E 4 2 . J * ( D T ) ( F A F 4 2 , J K - O ) 
52L F A ^ 2 , K « F A 4 2 . J + ( D T ) ( F A 0 4 2 . J K - F A F 4 2 , J K - F A D 4 2 . J K ) 
2 1 R F A F 4 2 . K L » ( 1 / F M C T . K ) ( F N 4 2 , K * W S H 4 2 . J ) 
4 9A F N 4 2 , K * S W l T C H ( 0 * F N . K # F M P 4 2 t K ) 
6 R FADR4,KL=0 
39R F A D 4 2 . K L » 0 E L A Y 3 ( F A R 4 2 . J K , F A S 0 4 ) 
C FAS04*4 
6 C F D L 4 2 * 3 0 0 
2 0 A D H 2 » 2 
HOWITZER AMMUNITION 
2 6 R FARH,KL*<FAFH, J K + F D L H - F A M . J ) / C D T H . K + 0 * 0 ) 
11 FAEH.K = FAEH.J + CDT ) ( F A F H . J K - O ) 
5 2 L FAH.K*FAH,J + CDT ) ( F A D H . J K - F A F H . J K - F A D R h # J K ^ O ) 
2 1 R FAFH.KI.sC l / F M C T . K X F N H . K + W S H H . J ) 
49A FNH,K = S W l T C H C O > F N , K#FMPH,K) 
6 R „ FADRH.KL»0 
3 9 R FADH,KLxDELAY3(FARH.JK#FASDH) 
C F A S D H * 3 
C FDLH»300 
2 0 A DIH»2 
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APPENDIX C 
UNIT ACTIVITY LEVEL EQUATIONS 
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F R I E N D L Y A C T I V I T Y L E V F L .... F t J « f M ^ ^ P ^ i ^ J ^ F K s i ^ ; ^ i . j ) 51R F U A 1 . K L * C L I P ( F U I 2 . J K # 0 # 4 , F U A . J ) 
FUI? .KL=2 
51R FUO.KL=CLlPC0#FU01.JK,FMB,0*FUA t J ) 5i R FU [ jJ .KL*^LtP(0*FUQ2.JK, l ,FUA.J ) 
FNEMY ACTIVITY LEVFL 
1L EUA,K«EUA f j* fnT)CFUAI .JK-FUO. jK) 
51R EUAltKLsCLIPCFUAl.JK#0 'EMB«J#FUA.J) 
51R EUAl.KLsCLIPCEUA2.JK.0#A#EUA.J) 
FUA2»KL=^ 
51R E U 0 , K L « C L I P ( 0 * E U 0 1 . J K # E M B . 0 # F U A . J ) 
51R FU01 •KL=CLIP(0 'EU02«JK>1>EUA«J) 
EU02.KL=2 
APPENDIX D 
WEAPONS STRENGTH LEVEL EQUATIONS 
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ENEMY WEAPONS STRENGTH LEVELS 
51 A EWLR.KsCl IPCFWLR 1 .K#0»rMP , K # 0 ) 
51A EWLRl .KsCLIPCEWLRZ.KjOfRANDO.IoeOO) 
51 A EWLR2.KsCLIP(C# 1#RANIUK#EWSR.K) 
27 A EwSR»K=FMPSQ ,K/ETSHQ.K 
12A FMPSG .KsCFMP ,K KFMP .K) 
14 + ETSHG.K=FMPSQ,K+(FTSH.K)CETSH,K) 
51A ETSH#KBCLIP(TS«JLM#K#ETSH1.K#CALM.K#CALV.K) 
51A ETSHl .KaCLlP(TSQHM.K#TSOG.K#CAHM ,K#CAG«K) 
12+ TSQLM.KsCTSHLM.KMEtiDLM) 
12A TSOHM.KsCTSHHM.KHEBDHM) 
12A TSQG.Ka(TSHG.K )CEBDG) 
7 A CALM t K"EAELM ,K-EAELM. J 
7 A CAHM.K = EAEHM„K-EAFHM, J 
7A CAG,K = FAEG,K»FAEG. J 
29R E w R P . K t « 0 L L A Y 3 ( E W L R , J K # l 2 ) 
51A TSHLL.KsCLIP('TSHLM.K>C#TSHLM .K*0) 
1L TSHLM.KsTSHLM,J+CDT)CLMRR,JK-LMLR.JK) 
20R LMLR.KLsLMLRl.K /DT 
51 A L M L P l . K s C L I P C L M L l . K # 0 , C A L M t K # C A H M . K ) 
51 A LMLl .KSCLIPCFWLR .K#0#CALM ,K*CAG.K 5 
4VR LMRR t KLsSwiTCHCO#EWRR,JK*LMLP.JK) 
51A TSHMH .KsCLlPC TSHHM.K»0#TSHHM,K#0> 
1L TSHHM.K»TSHHM t J+(OT)CLMRR,JK-LMLR.JK) 
20R HMLP,KLsHMLR1•K/DT 
51A HMLR1,K«CLIP(HML1,K#0»CAHM.K#CALM # K) 
51A HMLl t KaCLlPCEWLK .K#0#CAHM.K#CAG.K) 
49R HMRR.KLsSwiTCHCO*FWRR tJK*HMLR.JK) 
51A TS1G,KBCLIPCTSHG.K#0*TSHG.K#0) 
1L TSHG.K«TSHG f J4CDT)CGRR,JK-GLP,JK) 
20R G L R . K L * G L R l I , K / D T 
51 A G L R U , K r C L l P C G L l . K > 0 > C A G , K * C A l M , K ) 
51A GLl .KaCLlPC.EWL«tK#0 ,CAG.K*CAHM.K) 
49R GRR.KL*SWITCHC0#EWRR.JK#GLR.JK) 
7A R A N U . K = ( U , 5 ) + R N U . K 
33A RNU.K«C1)N0ISE 
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FRIFNDLY WEAPONS STRENGTH LEVEL 
51A FWLR.K = C L I P C F W L R 1 . K # G , E M P . K # 0 ) 
51A FWLRl .KsCLIP(FWLR?,K,0>HANDO.J>f iOO) 
51A FWLP2.KsCLlP( OM#RANU. J^FWSR.K) 
2 7A FWSR 1K = EMPSd T K/F TSHQ.K 
12A E M P S i . K s ( E M P . K ) ( E M P , K ) 
14A F T S H G . K s E M P S Q . K + ( F T S H . K ) ( F T S H . K ) 
51A F T S H T K « c C l P ( T S Q 6 0 , K * F T S H l . K , C A 6 0 . K , C A 6 V . K ) 
SI A F T S H l . K s C L l P ( T S Q 8 1 # K , F T S H 2 . K , C A e i f K > C A e V # K ) 
51A FTSH? .KeCLIPC T S Q 4 2 . K > T S Q H . K # C A 4 2 , K * C A H . K ) 
12A T S Q 6 0 t K s ( T S H 6 0 . K ) ( F B D 6 0 ) 
12A TSOf l l .KsCTSHM . K K E B D 6 1 5 
12A TS04 2 . K = ( T S H 4 ? . K ) ( F B D 4 2 ) 
12A T S Q H . K s ( T S H H . K ) ( t B D H ) 
9R FWRP.KLsDLLAY3(FWLR.JK*12) 
1 A T S H 6 1 • K * C L I P C T S H 6 0 , K # 0 * T S H 6 0 , K » 0 ) 
1L T S H 6 0 . K s T S H 6 0 . J 4 ( 0 T ) ( R 6 0 R . J K - R 6 0 L , J K ) 
4 9R R 6 0 R . K L s S W I T C H ( 0 > F W R R . J K > R 6 0 L . J K ) 
20R R 6 0 L . K L » R 6 1 1 . K / D T 
51A R 6 l l . K * C L I P ( R 6 l L . K # 0 * C A 6 0 . K # C A 8 1 . K ) 
51A R 6 l L . K * C L l P C R 6 2 L . K , 0 > C A 6 Q . K # C A 4 2 . K ) 
51A R6 2 L . K = C L I P ( F W L R . K * 0 # C A 6 0 , K * C A H . K ) 
51 A T S H 8 2 . K x C L l P ( T S H 8 l . K * 0 * T S H 8 1 . K * 0 ) 
1L T S H 8 1 • K s T S H 8 1 . J * ( D T ) C R 8 1 R . J K - R 8 1 L . J K ) 
49R R 8 l R . K L s S W I T C H ( 0 * F W R R . j K # R 8 1 L . J K ) 
20R R8lL»KL«sR811 , K / D T 
51A R 8 1 J . K = C L I P ( R 8 2 . K > 0 > C A 8 1 . I O C A 6 0 . K ) 
51A R 8 2 . K s C L l P ( R 8 3 f K # 0 # C A 8 1 . K # C A 4 2 . K ) 
51A R8 3 f K » C L I P ( F W L R , K A 0 # C A 8 1 i K # C A M . K ) 51 A T S H 4 3 . K s C L l P ( T S H 4 2 . K # 0 > T S H 4 2 . K # 0 ) 
1L TSH4 2 .KsTSH4 2 . J + C D T X R 4 2 R . J.K-R42L 
49R R 4 2 R , KLsSWITCH CO*FWRR ,JK#R42L , J K ) 
20R R 4 2 L , K L * R 4 2 2 L . K / 0 T 
51A R 4 2 2 L . K « C L I P ( R 4 3 . K # Q * C A 4 2 . K ' C A 6 0 . K > 
51A R 4 3 t K « C L | P r R 4 4 . K * 0 # C A 4 2 i K » C A 8 1 . K ) 
51A R4 4 . K « C L I P ( F W L R t K # 0 # C A 4 2 , K # C A H . K ) 
51A T S H 1 . K * C L I P C T S H H , K , 0 > T S H H . K , 0 ) 
IL TSHH.K«TSHH. J - K D T ) ( R H R # JK-RHL . JK) 
4$R RHR.KL-SWITCHCO*FWRR,JIORHL.JK ) 
51A RHl . K s C L J P C R H 2 . K # 0 * C A H . » O C A 8 1 - K ) 
51A R H 2 . K « C L I P C F W L R , K , 0 # C A H . K > C A 4 2 . K ) 
20R R H L . K L - R H U . K / D T 
51 A R H l l • K * C L I P < R H 1 1 K > 0 > C A H . J > C A 6 0 . K ) 
7A C A 6 0 , K « F A E 6 0 , K - F A E 6 0 . J 
7A C A 8 1 t K « F A E 8 1 . K - F A E 8 1 , J 
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FRIFNOLY TROOP STRFNGTH LEKEL 
51A FTS # K*C1IP(FTUK#0#FT1 .K>0) 
Ik F | ^ K » F T J # JFCDTXFTRR. JK-FTLR, J K ) 
44R FTLR!KL=(EMET.K)(FTD.J)/OT 
13A EMET,K*(FE.KXEMP # KXPFTK TK ) 
ENEMY TROOP STRENGTH LEVEL 
51A ETS.KXCLIPCETL.K>0,ETL.LOO) 
1L ETL.K*ETL•J*(OT METRR.JK-ETLR. JK> 
6R ETRR,KL=0 
44R ETLR.KLSCFMET.K)CETD.K)/DT 
13A FMET,K«CEL.K XFMP.K XPETK.K > 
APPENDIX F 
MISSION POTENTIAL EQUATIONS 
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ENEMY MISSION POTENTIAL 
8A FMP .KaEMPLM .K + EMPHM . K 4 E M P G . K 
12A FMPLM.KsCWSHL.KKEBOLM ) 
EMPHM.KsC*SHM,K)CEBDHM)C.5) 
12A E M P G . K * ( W S G.K ) C E B D G ) ( . 6 ) 
49A WSHL ,KsSWITCH(0>ASHL.K>RFLM.K) 
49A rtSHM,KsSWlTCHCO#ASHM.K#RFHM.K) 
49 A WSG.K«SWlTCHfO*ASHG,K,HFG.K) 
5 1 A ASHL t K«CLiPCO,MSHLM.K*MSHLM.K ,EALM ,K) 
51 A ASHM.KsCLlP(0#MSHHM t K#MSHHM.K»FAHM t K) 
5 I A ASHG,K = CLfP(0 ,MSHG.K#MSHG.K#FAG.K) 




49A MSHG,K*SWITCH(USHG.K#USHG2.K#VELG t K) U S HlHE3:H:l!EWt«8LL .K.TSH L 2.K .rO».K,2> 20A T S H L 2 , K = T S H L L . K / 2 
51A USHHM,K«CLIP(TSHMH , K » 0 # E U A . K » 3 ) 




51A RFHM.K=CLIP(1 ,0»MXHM,RAHM,K) 
51A RFG.KsCl IPf1 .0*MXG#RAG.K ) 
FRIENDLY MISSION POTENTIAL 
9A FMP.K = FMP60 .K+FiVP8l .K + FMP42.K+FMPH ,K4l 
12A F M P 6 0 t K s ( A S H A 0.K ) ( F B D 6 0 ) 
F M P 8 1 , K s C A S H P l t K ) ( E B D 8 1 ) C . 6 ) 
F M P A ? , K s ( A S H 4 2 t K ) C F B D 4 2 ) ( , 7 ) 
FMPH.K = ( A S H H . K M E B D H ) ( . 8 ) 
49A W $ H 6 G.KsSwlTCH ( 0 > A S H 6 0 , K , R F 6 0 #K) 49A WsH81.K*SWiTCH (0#ASH81.K#RF81.K) 
49A WSHA2.KsSWITf.H (0#ASHA2tK*RF42tK) 
49A rtSHH.K=$*ITCH(0#ASHH,K#RFH.K) 
51A A S H 6 0 . K c C L l P ( 0 ' M S H 6 0.K# M S H 6 C . K , F A 6 0 . K ) 
51A ASH81.KsCLlP(0»MSH81.K#MSH81.K#FA81.K) 
51A A S H 4 ? , K = C L I P C 0 ^ M S H ^ 2 , K > M S H 4 2 . K ^ F A 4 2 . K ) 
51A ASHH.K=CLIP(0*MSHH.K>MSHH.K>FAH,K) 
49A M S H 6 0 . K = S W I T C H ( U S H 6 0 . K # U S H 6 2 . K * V E L 6 0 , K ) 
20A U S H 6 2 . K r U S H 6 0 . K / 2 a r . i . 
49 A MSHfl l ,KrShITCH(USH8l ,K>USH8 3 . K ^ V E L 8 l t K ) 
20A U S H 8 3 . K = U S H 8 l . K / 2 n % 
4 9A M S H 4 2 , K = S W I T C H ( U S H 4 2 . K # U S H 4 5 , K ^ V E L 4 2 , K ) 
20A USH45 ,K = Ij§H4? , K / 2 
49A MSHH.K=SWlTCH(USHH,K^USHH2,K*vELH tK) 
2QA USHH2.K=USHH.K/2 
51A USH60.K = CLIPCTSH61 , K # 0 # F U A . K # 1 ) 
51A USH81 ,K«CLIPCTSH82.K#Q#FUA . K , l ) 
51A USH42,K = CLIPC T S H 4 3 , K > 0 > F U A . K * 2 ) 
51A U S H H , K « C L I P C T S H 1 . K # 0 # F U A . K # 3 ) 
C E B D 6 0 s l 8 
C E B 0 8 1 » 2 5 
C EBD42«40 
C EBDH=30 
51A R F 6 0 t K = C L I P ( 1 > 0 * M X 6 0 # R A 6 0 . K ) 51A R F 8 l . K « C L T P ( l , 0 # M X 8 i > R A 8 1 . K ) 51A R F A 2 , K * C L I P ( 1 , 0 » M X 4 2 > R A 4 2 . K ) 
51A R F H t K * C L l P C l # 0 , M X H * R A H , K ) 
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APPENDIX G 
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F H I F N O L Y TROOP O E N S I T Y F A C T O R 
F T D . K - T T S . J / F D F . K 
F R I F N D L Y E X P O S U R E F A C T O R 
F E . K = C L l P ( F E A . K > F F D , K , S R E F > 0 ) 
F E A . K * C L I P C 0 . 9 8 # F E 1 , K # E M I P 1 K # 1 ) 
F E 1 t K * T A B H L C K I L A # E A D L # 0 # 0 . 0 2 * O . 0 0 5 ) 
K I L A * = 0 . 9 8 / 0 / 0 . 7 5 / 0 , 0 0 5 / 0 . 5 5 / 0 , 0 I / O . 5 0 / 0 . 0 l s / C . A 5 / Q . 0 2 
F F D . K = S W l T C H ( F D L . K * F O . K * S S R ) 
F l ) L . K * T A B H L ( K I L D L # F A D L * 0 * 0 . 0 2 # 0 . 0 0 5 ) 
K l L 0 L * s 0 « 5 0 / O / 0 . 2 7 / 0 . 0 0 b / 0 . 2 6 / 0 . 0 1 / 0 . 2 6 / 0 . 0 1 5 / 0 . 2 5 / 0 . 0 2 
F D . K = T A B H L ( K I L D # E A D L # 0 * 0 . 0 2 * 0 . 0 0 5 ) 
K I L D * = 0 . 5 0 / 0 / 0 . 1 5 / 0 , 0 0 5 / 0 . 1 3 / 0 . 0 1 / 0 . 1 2 / C . 0 1 5 / 0 . 1 1 / C . 0 2 
E N E M Y T R O U P O E N S I T Y F A C T O R 
E T D , K « E T S . J / F D F . K 
E D D F . K « s W l t C M ' ( 4 C 0 , 6 O 0 ; s S R ) } 
ENEMY EXPOSURE FACTOR 
E E . K * C L l P ( E E A . K # E D P . K # 0 * $ P E F ) 
E E A , K « C L l H C 0 , V 8 # E E l T K # F M I P . K # n 
E E 1 . K * T A B H L ( K I L A # F A D L # 0 * O . G 2 # 0 . 0 0 5 ) 
E D P . K * S W l T O U E O L . K # D E . K # S S R ) 
E D L . K « T A S N L C K I L D L * F A D L * 0 * 0 . 0 2 , 0 , 0 0 5 ) 
n E . K s T A B H L ( K T L 0 # F A D L # 0 # 0 , 0 2 * O . O C 5 ) 
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P R O B A B I L I T Y Of FRIFNDLY TROOP KILL 
F D D . K s ( l ) N O R M R N ( 0 # F C E P . K ) 
F C E p , K = ( i / F B F A , K ) ( F C P 6 0 , K + F C P 8 l , K f F C P 4 2 . K + F r P H . K ) 
F C P 6 0 , K = ( C E P 6 0 ) ( W S H 6 0 . K ) 
F C P 8 1 . K « ( C E P f l l ) C W S H 8 1 , K ) 









51A FPTAC.KbCLIPCS0.K»FS1,K#RANDU.K#2 00) 
51A F5UKsCLfP(FSP.K#FSU.K#RAND0.K#AA4) 
51 A F S P . K s C L IP(0 .V#0.7#SREF#0) 
51A FSU,K=CLIPC0.5»0.A#SREF»0) 
6A SC»K=1 
51A PTFK,K = CLlPcp#PTFl fK#RANOC.J»eOg) 51A ptFl.KscLlP(0#PTF$A.K#ED.K#EFBO<».K) 
20A EEBD4 . K s E E B D . K / 4 
20A PTE2A,KsPTF2,K/EEBn.K 
32A PTF2.K=(EEBU,K)C0SCC2PI)(ED.K)/EEBD8.K> 
F t.BDe.KsCEEBn.KM A) 
8A F B F A . K = F B F L M . K + E B F H M . K * E H F G « K 
24A EF^n,K=FMPtK/FdFA.K 20 A EBFLK.KsFMPLM.K/FBDLM 








PROBABILITY nF ENEMY TROOP KILL 
12 A PETK,Ks(EPTAn.K)(PTEK.K) 
51A EPTAG«K=CLIP(Sa«K»ESl*K»RANDn.K»2 00) 
5 1 A ESl.K*CLlP(ESP.K#ESU.K»RAND0 fK#444) 5 1 A ESP.K = CLIP (0 ,9 ,0 ,7#0#SREF) 
51A ESU,KaCLlP(0,5#Of4#0#SRfF) 
51A pTEK,K = rLIPfC,PTEl fK#RANDO.K»enO) 51A PTEl.K*CLIP(fi,PTE2A tK#DF.K#FFRD4.K) 20A FEBDA.K=FEBD.K/4 
20A PTF.?A,K=PTE2.K/FLH0.K % 32A PTE2.K«(FEBD,K)C0SCC2Hl)CPF,K)/FEB0ti.K) 
FEBD8.K=(FEB0.K)C4) 
20A FEBD.KsFMP.K/FdFA.K 
20A FBDfiO ,KsFMP6 0 .K/EBD60 
20A FBD8l .KsFMP81 t K/EBQ81 





MOVEMENT AND TERRAIN EQUATIONS 
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MQVFMFNT AND TERRAIN SECTION 
TERRAIN 
7A TPZ. K »TZ*TPZ7.•K 
32A T P Z Z . K * C T Z Z . K ) C G S ( ( 2 P I ) ( 1 ) / T P P P ) 
C T Z « 5 0 0 
7 A TZZ.K*TROL*TRNDO.K 
C TROL'IO 
33A TRNDO.Ks(TRND)NOlSE 
C I P P P M ° 0 C TRND«iO 
C T A V 7 = 1 0 0 0 
ROLE SWITCHES i IBSf"1 
C SSR«0 
49A ROLE•K«SWITCHC500,OROL>SR) 
49A ORBL,K = S W ITC H ( 1 0 0 , 0 # S S R ) 
FRIENDLY TARGET MOVEMENT 
J + C D T X R T U . J K - O ) 
44R RTU,KL*(SHEF)CRTUU,K) /DT 
51A RTUU»K«CLIP(RTA1• K>FDP • K>SREF/O ) 
14A RTA, K«R0L1.K + ( R 0 L 2 , K X S L F T G . K ) 
51A R T A l t K « C L l P ( 1 0 0 # R T A t K # 4 6 0 * M R A . K ) 
7RA R 0 L 1 # K * 1 + R 0 L E . K 
20A R0L2 • KsROLE• K / 2 
31A S L F T G . K s C - l ) S I N C ( 2 P I X F T G , J ) / T P P ) 
51A FDPtKaCLlP(RTA T K>TMC .K#MAR#MRA T K) 
7A M R A T K » F T G , K - F T G . K 
49C M A R » S W I T C H ( - 2 0 # 4 6 0 , S S R ) 
7A ELFTG .KsELEFT .K + TAVZ 
32A E L E F T , K * C T P Z . K ) C 0 S ( C 2 P I X F T G . K ) / T P P ) 
51A T 0 P . K « C L l P ( 0 . R T A . K , E L F T G F K , E L F T G . J ) 
51A T M C . K » C L I P C T O P , K # R T A # K » E L F T G . K # T M Z , K ) 
44A T M Z . K » C T M Z Z . K X 7 ) / 8 
7A T M Z Z T K « T A V Z 4 T P Z . K 
ENEMY TARGET MOVEMENT 
7N E T G * X + 1 0 5 0 0 
1L E T G T K » E T G , j * ( D T X E R T U T J K - Q ) 
44R E R T u , K L s C S R E F X t R T U U . K ) / D T 
51A ERTUU .K*CLIP(ERTA1.K 'EFDP . K* 0#SREF) 
14A E R l A , K * R Q L l A K * ( R 0 L 2 i K ) ( S L E T G . K ) 
51A ERTA1 . K x C L I P C 1 0 0 * E R T A , K ' 4 6 0 > M R A . K ) 
51 A E F D P , K « C I - I P < E R T A »K#ETMC«K#MAR,MRA ,K ) 
51A ETMC.K*CLlP<ETOP.K>ERTA.K#ELETG.K>TMZ,K) 
31A SLEIG ) S I N ( C 2 P I ) ( E T G , J ) / T P P ) 
7A ELETG t K«ELEET,K+TAVZ„ 
32A E L E E T . K « ( T P Z » K ) C 0 S ( ( 2 P I ) ( E T G . K ) / T P P ) 
51A E T O P . K « C L I P < 0 # E R T A , K > E L E T G , K # E L E T G . J ) 
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FRIFNDLY WEAPONS MOVEMENT 
7N X 6 0 * X + 9 4 0 0 
R VEL40 .KL»{SRFF)(VECL6 . I?)/DT 
51 A VFLL6«K*CLIPfO*VLL60.K*MD60.K#R0 60«K> 
51A M D 6 0 t K s c L I P ( M X 6 0 3*RA60.K#SREF#0 ) 
51A R D 6 0 t K s C L l P ( R A 6 0 , K # M X 6 0 4 * S R E F # 0 ) 
44C M X 6 0 3 s ( 3 ) ( M X 6 0 ) / 4 
2QC MX604«MX60/4 
4VA VLL60.KsSWITC:HCO#VL60.K#DSL60.K ) 
rA DSL6Q.K = MX605-0SP60.K 
44C M X 6 0 5 = ( M X 6 0 ) ( 5 ) / 1 2 
1L DSP60.KsDSP60. J-KDT ) ( VL60# JK-0MP60.JK ) 
2QR DMP60.KL S UMPM.K/DT 
49A DMP61 .KsSWITCHCO*VLM60•K#DSP60 • J ) 
12R VLM60.KL S 100000 
14R VL60 .KL = A v 6 0 ? * ( A V 6 0 4 ) (SLX60 . K ) 
20C AV602*AV60/2 
2QC A v 6 0 4 » A v 6 0 / 4 
31A S L X 6 0 . K s ( - l ) S J N ( ( 2 p I ) ( X 6 0 t J ) / T p p ) 
C AV60*500 
7N X 8 U X 4 9 0 0 0 
1L X 6 L K » X 8 l . J * C D T ) ( V E L f l l « J K - 0 > 
44R VEL81#KL*CSRFF)(VELL8,K)/DT 
51A VELL8 .KsCLIP(0#VLL81 .K#M081 ,K ,RD81 ,K) 
51A M D 8 1 # K » c L l P ( M X 8 l 3 # R A 8 1 f K # S R t F # 0 ) 
51A RD81 .K«CLIP(RA81 .K#MX8H#SREF#0) 




44A MX815 = (MX81 ) f 5 ) / 1 2 
1L DSP8I •KsQSPfil . J - K D T H V L 8 1 . JK-DMP81 • JK> 
2QR DMP81«KL aDMPfl2jK/DT 
49A DMP82*K=SWITCHC0#VLM81.K^OSPei ,J) 1?B vtSf l*L«Av8?9$(AV814) (SLX81 t K) 
20C A V 8 l 2 « A V f l l / 2 
2QC AV§14*AV81/4 c Sfeaflioo > S I N ( ( 2 P * > c * 8 1 « J ) / T P P ) 
7N X42aX485Q0 
1L X 4 2 t K s X 4 2 t j ^ ( D T ) ( V E L 4 2 . J K - 0 ) 
44R V E U 4 2 . K L » ( S R F F ) ( V E L L 4 . K ) / D T 
51A VELL4,KsCLIP(0*VLL42.K#MD4 2 . K , R D 4 2 t K ) 
51A M D 4 2 t K s C L l P c M X 4 2 3 , R A 4 2 t K > S R E F , 0 ) 
51A RDA2 1 K*CLIP(RA42.K#MX424,SREF#0) 
44C M X 4 2 3 « ( 3 ) ( M X 4 2 ) / 4 
20C MX,4 4«MX42 /4 , 
- , K « S W I T C H 
7A D S L 4 2 , K * M x 4 2 5 - D S P * 2 t K 
49A V L L 4 2 , K « S W I T C H ( 0 # V L 4 2 # K ^ D S L 4 2 . K ) 
44C M X 4 2 5 « ( M X 4 2 ) ( 5 ) / 1 2 
11 D S P 4 2 . K . D S P 4 2 , J 4 ( D T ) ( V L 4 2 . J K - D M P 4 2 . J K ) 
20R DMP42»KL»DMP43tK/DT 
49A DMP4 3 , K m S W I T C H ( 0 , v L M 4 2 . K , D S P 4 2 , J ) 
12R VLM42tKL*10QQ00 
14R V L 4 2 t K L e A V 4 2 ? * C A V 4 2 4 ) ( S L X 4 2 . K ) 
20C A V 4 2 2 « A V 4 2 / 2 
20C A v A 2 4 * A y 4 2 / 4 
31A S L X A 2 . K . C 1 ) S 1 N ( ( 2 P I ) ( X 4 2 . J ) / T P P ) 
C A V 4 2 « 7 0 0 
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7N XH=X+8000 
1L XH.K = XH. J + CDTKVEIH. JK -O ) 
44R VEUH .KL=(SREF)(VELLH.K ) /DT 
5IA VELLH.KSCLIPC 0 , VLLH.K#MDH • K>RDH.K ) 
51A MDHtK*CL IP(MXH3#RAH#K#SREF#0) 






L DSPH ,K«DSPH. JI + (DT)( VLH. JK-DMPH, JK ) 




31 A S L X H . K « C 1 )STNC ( 2 P I )(XH. J ) / T P P ) 
C AVH=700 
ENEMY WEAPONS MOVEMENT 
7N XLMMIOOO 
II XLM .KAXLM,J+(OT)(VELLM . JK -0 ) 
12R VELLM .KL*(SRFF) (VELM ,K 5/DT 
51 A VELM ,K«CLIP(0»VLLM ,K>MDLM T K#RDLM ,K) 51A MDLM.KECUP<MXLM3>RALM.K,0#SREF) 
51A RDLM1K»CL1P(RALM,K,MXLM4#0#SREF) 44C MXLM3*(3)<MXLM)/4 
20C MXLM4*MxLM/4 
49 A VLLM.KSSWLTCHCO#VLM,K,DSLM,K) 
7A DSLM,K=MXLM5*DSPLM,K 
44C MXLM5«(MXLM)C5)/12 
1L DSPLM.KSDSPLM,J + (DT )CVLM.JK-DMPLM,JK ) 
20R DMPLMTKL*DMPLL»K/DT 
49 A DMPLL.K*5WLTCHC0*VLML.K>DSPLMtJ) 
12R VLML .KLELOOOOO 
14R VLM T KL*AVLM2+CAVLM4)(SLXLM .K) 
20C AvLM2=AvLM/2 
20C AvLM4«AvLM /4 
31 A SLXLM .K*( -L ) S I N((2P I ) CXLM . J ) /TPP ) 
C AVLM«500 
7N XHM«11500 
1L XHM.K*XHM,J + COT KVELHM.JK-O) 44R VELHM,KLA(SREF)(VEHMtK5/DT 51 A VEHM,K«cUP(0> VLHM.K>MOHM . K>RDHM . K ) 
51A MDHMTK«CLIP(MXHM3#RAHM.K#0#SREF) 
51A ROHM ,K*CL IP(RAHM , K>MXHM4,0>SREF ) 
44C MXHM3«C3)(MXHM)/4 
2QC MXHM4«MXHM/4 
49A VLHM ,K*SWITCHCO#VHM ,K,DSHM.K) 
7A DSHM.K«MXHM5-DSPHM ,K 





14R VHM t KL«AVHM2+(AVHM4)(SLXHM t K) 20C AVHA2«AVHM/2 
70C AVHM4»AVHM/4 




XL XG.K = XG E J + CDT )(VELG, JK-O ) 







7 A OSG.KAMXGS-OSPG.K 
44C MXG5S(MXG)(5)/12 
1L DSPG,K = OSPG #J*(DT)(VG. JK-DMPG . JK ) 
20R OMPG .KL = DMPG'I ,K/OT 
49A DMPG1 ,KSSWITRHCO#VLMG.K#DSPG.J) 
12R VLMG.KLSLOOOOO 
14A VG.K»AVG2 + ( AVG4MSLXG.K) 
20C AVG2«AVG/2 
20C AVG4=AVG^4 




7 A RA60»K S ETG 1 K"X60JK 
7A RA81 ,K = EETG.K-X81 ,K 
7A RA42,K«EETG.K-X42 F K 
7A RAH,K=EETG.K"XH#K 
ENEMY RANGES 
7A RALM,K = XLM,K"FFTG ,K 
7A RAHM.KSXHM.K-FFTG.K 
7A RAG. KSXG.K-FFTG. K 
51 A EETG.K*CLIP(FCTG.K#ETG .K#RAN0F).K#800 > 
51A ECTG.KSCLIP(XLM.K,ECTL,K#CALMTK»CALV,K) 
51A CALV,KSCLTP(CAHM,K,CAG,K,CAHM,K,CAG,K) 
51 A ECT1,K=CLIPCXHM.K#XG,K#CAHM,K#CAG.K) 
51A FFTGTK«CLLP(FCTGTK#FTGTK#RANDn.J'800> 
51A FCTG,K*CLLPCX60TK#FCTL,K#CA60.K#CA6V.K) 
5 1 A CA6V.K«CLLP(CA81TK#CA4H TK#CA81.K#CAaH.K) 
51 A CA4H,KBcLIp(CA42,K#CAH.K*CA42.K#CAHTK) 
51A FCTL FK«CLIPCX8UK#FCT2TK#CA81,K*CA8V.K) 
51A CA8V.KSCLLPCCA42.K#CAH.K#CA42.K#CAH#K) 



















6N FT 1 = 1 32 








6N F A E G = 0 
6N EAGSEDLG 









6N FAH=FQLH 6 N FMIPSO 






51N TSHLW = CLIPCL«#B>0#SREF ) 
6N TSHHM *6 
6N TSHG*0 
C SREF* - 1 
PRINT 1)ETS/2)FMP/3)FM0/A)FMET/5)PFTK/6)ETD/7)EE/8)EUA/9)ETG/10)XLM 
PRINT 11)XHM/12)XG/13)* , „ ^ 
PRINT 1)FTS/2)EMP/3)EMD/A)EWET/5)PFTK/8)FTD/7)FE/8)FUA/9)FTG/10)X60 
PRINT 1 1 > X 8 1 / 1 2 ) X 4 ? / 1 3 ) X H 
PRINT 1)FMIP/2)FMACR/3)FMDR/4)FMB/'5)FMAR 
PRINT 1 )EMIP/2)EMACR/3)FMOR/4)EHB/L5)EMAR T PRINT 10 )WSH60/11 )ASH6 0/12)MSH60/13)TSH60/L4L)USH6 0 
PRINT 10)WSH81/11)ASH81/12)MSH81/13)TSH81/1(I)USH81 
PRINT 10)WSH4 2/11)ASH4 2/12)MSH4 2/13)TSH42/14)USH<I2 
PRINT 10)WSHH/U)ASHM/1?)MSHH/13)TSHH/14)USHH 
PRINT L)WSHL/2)ASHL./3)MSHLM/4)TSHLM/5)USHLM 
PRINT 1)WSHM/2)ASHM/3)MSHHM/4)TSHHM/5 )USHHM 
PRINT 1)W$G/?) ASHG/3)MSHG/4)TSHG/5)USHG, X M 
PRINT 1 KALM/2)CAFLM/i)CAG/.6)CA60/7)CA8I/8 )CA42/9)CAH 




BASE MIX VALIDATION RUNS 
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Run No. 1 (Attack) 
as 3 ci a a a. as a O O cs GO CS C? in C? 
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Run No- 2 (Attack) 
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U . U . L l U U U U . U U - l a . 
• u u 
a n a a . a . O . C L 
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U t b a U J U i t a J u J 
a a • | 
U J 1 
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o U i U J U J U i U l U i U l 
• I • 
u u> o L U U J U J U I 
O C M 
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O f ( 3 
. u _ U _ 
d a a 
a _ ( L i n a . 
U L U U U 
tx Q Q . e t a n 
a 
a _ I l i 
i i 
n 1 Lt U . U . . U . u u • i 
5 : L u-
1 o -
1 u. • 
ft ^ 1 U J 1 
U i U J U J U J U 
I I 1 I | U J U J U J U J U J U . U . 
t / 5 o 
>— • 1 | | 
: \ j U J o 
U J o 
an n t a ft 
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LLU.U-LI-U.U-U_LL_LI.L̂ U.U-U-LI_LI_ I 
ft- ft. 
•> ft 
G_ 1 I 1 
II I-KXI AJ.«J .AJ.L ft 1 n I ft N CL I T— 
<R I a o LL. 1 
1 3 1 LVILVLUJUJLIJUJUJ 
A- 0.0.0.0-0.0. U_UJLJJU.U; II | 1 1 L/L O V- 1 1 RO UL o 
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Run No. 6 (Attack) 
C5 
G OAOOO C ACTA &> 
e CI 1 1 
II «— 1 1 I 
* 1 1 
I I I A FX 
L» T I I 
T— 1 I I U. O-TLO. IRI.FI. Q 
OL 1 1 U.U.. U.U.IO.U.U.U.U.U.LL.U.. IT UJUJ ..»J_J ^ J - J -jJuAJ.-LJ LAJ A 1 U U U U U.U T V— X U I a G C C G I 1 
•> I I I UJU.UJ 
II 1 G I U. <JT G UJUIUJUJ "SI I— • | I 1 U'LJLJLJL-J UJ 




ALL 60 mm MIX RUNS 
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1 / 3 
a . 
i i 
— • a . 
< x U J 
U J 
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t / J 




O J • 
U . U . U - U . U - U » U - U . U ~ U _ U -
I 
Q _ O . Q L 
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a . 
O . O . O . q . 
U J U J U J U J U J U J U J 
I 
o a . 
• i 
o 
a . u j u j u i u j u j u j u j 
0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 
a . a . 
U J U J 
a at 
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INCREASED 81 mm MIX RUNS 
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Run No. 1 (Attack) 
1 1 1 
O • 1 I CEO A • O 
• • • 
• COO • 
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T • 1 
O 1 • A. I A. 
• I • 
• I 
C © • 1 C? 1 U U U LV LV UU U U- U • I • C? CS OO AS 
• O O O. I O A 
O 1 • I 
O 1 I I 
II CL w—l | I • 2. A. A U * • I 
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U II 1 • 1 CO 
• • • U. 0.0.0.0. A Q- Q- O. O.O. 
L • 1 % 
Q_ • 1 
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Run No. 2 (Attack) 
1 1 • 
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Run No. 3 (Attack) 
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INCREASED 4 . 2 inch MIX RUNS 
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Run No. 2 
• 1 t 1 
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Run No. 3 
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Run No. 4 
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